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The Right to Regulate in Investor–
State Arbitration: Slicing and 
Dicing Regulatory Carve-Outs 
 
 
Vera Korzun* 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
  This Article examines the “right to regulate” as the power of 
a sovereign state to adopt and maintain government measures for 
public welfare objectives. It explores how claims by foreign 
investors in investor–state dispute settlement (ISDS) may 
interfere with the state’s ability to regulate, and how the state can 
protect its right in international investment agreements. The 
Article first explains the structure of modern international 
investment law and dispute resolution. It next turns to the right 
to regulate and explores why regulatory disputes represent a 
major challenge for ISDS. It continues by analyzing how 
exceptions, exclusions, and other safeguard provisions can be 
used in investment treaties to protect the right to regulate. It then 
critically examines the tobacco carve-out and other safeguard 
provisions of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement as 
to their ability to protect the right to regulate. Finally, the Article 
explores alternative solutions to the challenges of ISDS. It 
concludes by arguing that regulatory disputes are best resolved 
through a hybrid system of dispute resolution that is amenable to 
both private interests and public policy considerations. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 The reputation of investor–state dispute settlement (ISDS) has 
suffered a heavy blow in recent years. Ever since Australia and 
Uruguay had to defend their tobacco plain-packaging legislation in 
investor–state arbitrations against multinational tobacco company 
Philip Morris International, Inc.,1 it became clear that foreign 
                                                                                                                       
 1. See, e.g., Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Austl., PCA Case No. 2012-12, Award on 
Jurisdiction and Admissibility (UNCITRAL 2015), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default 
/files/case-documents/italaw7303_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/LGV7-X4X7] (archived Jan. 20, 
2017) [hereinafter Philip Morris Asia]. Although four years after the notice of arbitration 
was served, Australia won in this investor–state arbitration, the reputation of ISDS has 
been damaged. In large part, because this dispute showed how legitimate government 
measures can be challenged in investor–state arbitration through creative treaty- and 
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investors can use ISDS to challenge government measures adopted for 
legitimate public welfare objectives. Outraged over the dispute with 
Philip Morris, the Australian government vowed that it would no 
longer include ISDS in its international investment agreements 
(IIAs).2 And with Australia present at the negotiating table of the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)3 Agreement, the inclusion of ISDS in 
the TPP was first called into question.4 However, by February 2016, 
with a new federal government in power, Australia consented to ISDS 
and signed the TPP together with eleven other Asia-Pacific nations.5 
Yet, outside of the Asia-Pacific Region, the debate about the costs and 
benefits of investor–state arbitration continued with renewed vigor as 
                                                                                                                       
forum-shopping. See also Philip Morris Brands Sàrl v. Uru., ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, 
Award (July 8, 2016), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7417 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/KX3J-TYCC] (archived Jan. 21, 2017) [hereinafter Philip Morris 
Brands Sàrl] (describing a similar claim against Uruguay). 
 2. AUSTL. GOV’T, DEPT. OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE, GILLARD GOVERNMENT 
TRADE POLICY STATEMENT: TRADING OUR WAY TO MORE JOBS AND PROSPERITY 14 (2011), 
http://blogs.usyd.edu.au/japaneselaw/2011_Gillard%20Govt%20Trade%20Policy%20 
Statement.pdf [https://perma.cc/P282-GZF4] (archived Jan. 21, 2017) (“In the past, 
Australian Governments have sought the inclusion of investor–state dispute resolution 
procedures in trade agreements with developing countries at the behest of Australian 
businesses. The Gillard Government will discontinue this practice.”). 
 3. Trans-Pacific Partnership, Feb. 4, 2016, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/ 
free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text [https://perma.cc/Z59T-EHFT] 
(archived Feb. 1, 2017) [hereinafter TPP]. 
 4. The TPP was negotiated behind the closed door, leaving the public largely in 
the dark as to the details of negotiation process. In March 2012, Australian Trade 
Minister Craig Emerson was quoted as saying that “[w]e do not and will not support 
investor–state dispute settlement provisions. This is government policy.” See Adam 
Gartrell, Labor Standing Firm on Pacific Trade Deal, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD 
(Mar. 5, 2012), http://www.smh.com.au//breaking-news-national/labor-standing-firm-
on-pacific-trade-deal-20120305-1ue2b.html [https://perma.cc/E2SR-UFXZ] (archived 
Mar. 19, 2017). In spring 2015, the Australian government was still reluctant to agree 
on ISDS in the TPP. Noticeably, a draft TPP’s investment chapter published by 
WikiLeaks in March 2015 contained footnote 29, which excluded application of the ISDS 
provisions with respect to Australia and investors from Australia. See Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Treaty: Advanced Investment Chapter working document for all 12 nations 
(Jan. 20, 2015 draft), WikiLeaks release: March 25, 2015, n. 29, https://wikileaks.org/ 
tpp-investment/ [https://perma.cc/86K4-YER4] (archived Mar. 6, 2017) (“Section B 
[“Investor–State Dispute Settlement”] does not apply to Australia or an investor of 
Australia. Notwithstanding any provision of this Agreement, Australia does not consent 
to the submission of a claim to arbitration under this Section.”). 
 5. The TPP was signed on February 4, 2016 by Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, 
Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States, and 
Vietnam. The future of the TPP is currently unclear as the United States under the new 
administration has begun withdrawing from the TPP. See Peter Baker, Trump Abandons 
Trans-Pacific Partnership, Obama’s Signature Trade Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/23/us/politics/tpp-trump-trade-nafta.html [https://perma. 
cc/A7XU-23E8] (archived Mar. 6, 2017). It remains to be seen whether the TPP will 
survive the United States’ withdrawal. 
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part of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)6 
negotiations. This time ISDS threatened to undermine the treaty as a 
whole, as partners across the Atlantic are sharply divided on the merits 
of the ISDS regime.7 
 The critics of ISDS have long pointed to the lack of transparency, 
consistency, and overall legitimacy in the ISDS process, where private 
arbitrators are called upon to decide multi-million dollar claims 
against sovereign states. The opponents of investment treaty 
arbitration further allege that, through ISDS, foreign investors—most 
commonly multinational corporations—interfere with a government’s 
ability to regulate in the public interest.8 This includes protection of 
public health, public policy, safety, and the environment. The crusade 
against ISDS is now supported by evidence from recent investor–state 
arbitrations challenging government regulation, notably, in the 
nuclear energy sector in Germany, as part of the nuclear power phase-
out program,9 and in the renewable energy sector in Bulgaria, the 
                                                                                                                       
 6. EU Negotiating Texts in TTIP, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (July 14, 2016) 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1230 [https://perma.cc/37HG-EPEK] 
(archived Jan. 21, 2017) [hereinafter TTIP]. 
 7. See, e.g., ISDS: Important Questions and Answers, TRADEWINDS (Mar. 26, 
2015), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/blog/2015/march/isds-important-
questions-and-answers-0 [https://perma.cc/K9QV-7E7Z] (archived Jan. 20, 2017) 
(discussing the U.S. position (from the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative) on ISDS, 
approving the current system of investor–state arbitration); see also Cecilia Malmström, 
Proposing an Investment Court System, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Sept. 16, 
2015), http://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/malmstrom/blog/proposing-investment-
court-system_en [https://perma.cc/4CMW-RLPF] (archived Jan. 20, 2017) (discussing 
the EU position expressing dissatisfaction with modern ISDS and suggesting to replace 
it with an investment court system); Krista Hughes & Philip Blenkinsop, U.S. Wary of 
EU Proposal for Investment Court in Trade Pact, REUTERS (Oct. 29, 2015, 3:00 PM EDT), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-trade-ttip-idUSKCN0SN2LH20151029 [https://perma.cc/ 
V9TS-T8AP] (archived Jan. 21, 2017) (noting the U.S. reaction to the EU proposal). 
 8. See OECD, “Indirect Expropriation” and the “Right to Regulate” in 
International Investment Law 2 (OECD Working Papers on Int’l Inv., Paper No. 2004/04, 
2004) (“[T]here is increasing concern that concepts such as indirect expropriation may 
be applicable to regulatory measures aimed at protecting the environment, health and 
other welfare interests of society.”). 
 9. See, e.g., Vattenfall AB v. Federal Republic of Ger., ICSID Case 
No. ARB/12/12, http://www.italaw.com/cases/1654 [https://perma.cc/29UQ-YDAV] (archived 
Feb. 11, 2017) [hereinafter Vattenfall] (a pending investor–state arbitration under the 
Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) and the ICSID Convention and Arbitration Rules, where 
Vattenfall, state-owned Swedish energy company, is reportedly seeking compensation 
for its investments lost due to the shutdown by Germany of two reactors in Krümmel 
and Brunsbüttel, in line with the country’s energy phase-out plan). See also Nathalie 
Bernasconi-Osterwalder & Martin Dietrich Brauch, The State of Play in Vattenfall v. 
Germany II: Leaving the German Public in the Dark, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. 
(2014), http://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/state-of-play-vattenfall-vs-
germany-II-leaving-german-public-dark-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/84VY-PBZ3] (archived 
Jan. 21, 2017) (providing background information on the case). 
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Czech Republic, Italy, and Spain as a response to regulatory changes 
in their solar energy incentive programs.10 
 The supporters of ISDS defend the system by arguing that the 
ability to submit a claim directly to investor–state arbitration under an 
investment treaty remains an important factor for private investors 
seeking to invest abroad.11 And so, while the debate on the future of 
investor–state arbitration continues, it is clear that, for ISDS to 
survive, it has to respond to the most vocal objections regarding the 
lack of transparency, legitimacy, public accountability, and consistency 
in investment arbitration awards. 
 Regulatory disputes bring an additional layer to the discussion of 
the long-overdue reform of ISDS. Disputes of this type involve 
challenges by foreign investors to government measures of general 
application, such as laws, regulations, or executive acts.12 Regulatory 
disputes are particularly controversial because they allow foreign 
                                                                                                                       
 10. See, e.g., ENERGO-PRO a.s. v. Republic of Bulg., ICSID Case No. ARB/15/19, 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/630 [https://perma.cc/VR38-N5JT] 
(archived Jan. 19, 2017); EVN AG v. Republic of Bulg., ICSID Case No. ARB/13/17, 
http://www.italaw.com/cases/2171 [https://perma.cc/KF9R-7TYE] (archived Jan. 21, 
2017); Antaris Solar GmbH v. Czech, PCA Case No. 2014-01 (UNCITRAL 2013), 
https://pcacases.com/web/view/24 [https://perma.cc/FCD6-FVSZ] (archived Jan. 21, 
2017); Belenergia S.A. v. Italian Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/40, 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/CountryCases/103?partyRole=2 [https:// 
perma.cc/GZ6P-JZCY] (archived Feb. 1, 2017) (one of the six solar energy ICSID 
arbitration cases pending against Italy at the time of publication); Cordoba Beheer B.V. 
v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/16/27, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/ 
731 [https://perma.cc/FA3X-RZFF] (archived Jan. 21, 2017) (the latest of over 30 ICSID 
arbitrations commenced against Spain in the renewable energy sector); Luke Eric 
Peterson, Solar Investors File Arbitration against Czech Republic; Intra-EU BITs and 
Energy Charter Treaty at Center of Dispute, INV. ARB. REP. (May 15, 2013), 
https://www.iareporter.com/articles/solar-investors-file-arbitration-against-czech-republic-
intra-eu-bits-and-energy-charter-treaty-at-center-of-dispute/ [https://perma.cc/K732-
9MHQ] (archived Feb. 11, 2017) (describing arbitration filed against the Czech Republic 
by claimants objecting to the country’s recent treatment of investments in photovoltaic 
energy production); see Charles A. Patrizia et al., Investment Disputes Involving the 
Renewable Energy Industry Under the Energy Charter Treaty, GLOBAL ARB. REV. (Oct. 2, 
2015), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/chapter/1036076/investment-disputes-involving-
the-renewable-energy-industry-under-the-energy-charter-treaty [https://perma.cc/3PWB-
N27A] (archived Jan. 20, 2017) (providing an overview of regulatory changes in the 
renewable energy sector in these countries and the resultant investor–state 
arbitrations). 
 11. Ted Bromund, James M. Roberts & Riddhi Dasgupta, The Proposed Investor–
State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) Mechanism: U.S. Should Oppose EU Demand to 
Abandon It, HERITAGE FOUND. (Jan. 31, 2017, 5:40 PM), http://www.heritage.org/research/ 
reports/2015/07/the-proposed-investor-state-dispute-settlement-isds-mechanism-us-should-
oppose-eu-demand-to-abandon-it [https://perma.cc/U3JD-6J4M] (archived Feb. 1, 2017). 
 12. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2012 U.S. MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT 
TREATY art. 1, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/188371.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 20, 2017) [https://perma.cc/89YJ-VM7P] (archived Jan. 20, 2017) (providing that a 
“‘measure’ includes any law, regulation, procedure, requirement, or practice”) 
[hereinafter 2012 U.S. Model BIT]. 
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investors to challenge legitimate government measures in front of 
international arbitral tribunals.13 The concern is that international 
investment agreements and the ISDS regime have empowered foreign 
corporations to interfere with a state’s ability to regulate for the benefit 
of the public at large.14 In doing so, they have also placed the defending 
state at the mercy of private arbitral tribunals that are often too far 
removed from such states to properly consider the public policy 
implications of the challenged government measure.15 Furthermore, 
regulatory disputes may have a chilling effect on regulation worldwide, 
as the fear of ISDS may prompt governments to refrain from adopting 
a regulatory measure.16 This growing dissatisfaction with ISDS has led 
some countries to cancel or revise their bilateral investment treaties 
                                                                                                                       
 13. See, e.g., Gus Van Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration 
as a Species of Global Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 121, 124 (2006) (“This 
growth [of investment treaty arbitration] suggests that multinational enterprises are 
increasingly prepared to use investment arbitration to resolve disputes with states, 
indicating that investment arbitration has become an important method for foreign 
investors to resist state regulation and seek compensation for the costs that flow from 
the exercise of public authority.”). 
 14. See, e.g., TPP “Worst Trade Deal Ever,” Says Nobel-Winning Economist Joseph 
Stiglitz, CBC NEWS (Mar. 31, 2016), http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/joseph-stiglitz-
tpp-1.3515452 [https://perma.cc/VKW6-GP5Q] (archived Feb. 1, 2017) [hereinafter 
“Worst Trade Deal Ever”] (“Stiglitz takes issue with the TPP’s investment-protection 
provisions, which he says could interfere with the ability of governments to regulate 
business or to move toward a low-carbon economy.”). See also Van Harten & Loughlin, 
supra note 13, at 130 (observing that “a wide range of regulatory disputes between 
investors and the state has become subject to control through international arbitration 
at the instance of investors”). 
 15. See Van Harten & Loughlin, supra note 13, at 126 (“A key aspect of the 
investment treaty arbitration is that it transplants this private adjudicative model from 
the commercial sphere into the realm of government, thereby giving privately-contracted 
arbitrators the authority to make what are in essence governmental decisions.”). 
 16. Concerns over the chilling effect are frequently raised in scholarly and public 
policy debates on ISDS. See, e.g., Kyla Tienhaara, Regulatory Chill and the Threat of 
Arbitration: A View from Political Science, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW 
AND ARBITRATION 606, 606 (Chester Brown & Kate Miles eds., 2011) (arguing that the 
issue of regulatory chill has been “inadequately addressed and often prematurely 
dismissed by legal scholars”). Indeed, the Uruguayan government was reportedly 
considering whether to relax its tobacco control measures to prevent an impending claim 
by Philip Morris. See Alison Ross, Uruguay Urged to Fight on in Cigarette Claim, GLOBAL 
ARB. REV. (Aug. 13, 2010), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1029513/uruguay-
urged-to-fight-on-in-cigarette-claim [https://perma.cc/4HYV-X2A7] (archived Mar. 6, 
2017) (noting that in the summer of 2010 “Uruguayan ministers indicated the 
government may be prepared to reverse some of the legislation to stave off a potentially 
costly claim [by Philip Morris].”) However, there are no persuasive empirical data 
showing that investor–state arbitrations have a chilling effect on regulation. See 
Christine Côté, A Chilling Effect? The Impact of International Investment Agreements 
on National Regulatory Autonomy in the Areas of Health, Safety and the Environment 
2014 (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, London School of Economics), 
etheses.lse.ac.uk/897/8/Cote_A_Chilling_%20Effect.pdf [https://perma.cc/XAC5-ADEC] 
(archived Jan. 21, 2017) (concluding that empirical data do not support the hypothesis 
of regulatory chill). 
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(BITs);17 Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela even went so far as to 
denounce the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
between States and Nationals of Other States18 that established the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). 
 Responding to these concerns, governments and the international 
legal community introduced several procedural and structural changes 
to ISDS. In the last five years, through the United Nations Commission 
on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), they developed the Rules on 
Transparency,19 amended the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules,20 and 
adopted the United Nations Convention on Transparency21—all for 
treaty-based investor–state arbitration. In their IIAs, states also began 
incorporating provisions regarding arbitrators’ qualifications and 
                                                                                                                       
 17. See, e.g., Natasha Mellersh, No Longer a Fair Game?, AFR. L. & BUS. (Sept. 30, 
2015),  https://www.africanlawbusiness.com/news/5864-no-longer-a-fair-game [https:// 
perma.cc/VL5Z-LP6A] (archived Jan. 20, 2017) (observing that South Africa, for 
example, has terminated BITs with several EU countries, including Belgium, Germany, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom); see also Ben 
Bland & Shawn Donnan, Indonesia to Terminate More than 60 Bilateral Investment 
Treaties, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2014), https://www.ft.com/content/3755c1b2-b4e2-11e3-
af92-00144feabdc0 [https://perma.cc/A9GU-6NCS] (archived Feb. 1, 2017) (noting 
Indonesia seeks to cancel or renegotiate its more than 60 BITs); Marta Waldoch & Maciej 
Onoszko, Poland Plans to Cancel Bilateral Investment Treaties with EU, BLOOMBERG 
(Feb. 25, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-25/poland-seeks-to-
end-bilateral-investment-deals-with-eu-members [https://perma.cc/23BA-HNPM] (archived 
Jan. 20, 2017) (explaining Poland has stated that it considers terminating its intra-EU 
BITs); Luke Eric Peterson, Italy Follows Russia in Withdrawing from Energy Charter 
Treaty, but for Surprising Reason, INV. ARB. REP. (Apr. 17, 2015), https://www.iareporter 
.com/articles/italy-follows-russia-in-withdrawing-from-energy-charter-treaty-but-for-
surprising-reason/ [https://perma.cc/C4JU-J9S3] (archived Feb. 1, 2017) (noting that in 
January 2015, Italy announced its withdrawal from a multilateral agreement—the ECT). 
 18. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States (the Washington Convention), Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 
[hereinafter ICSID Convention]; Sergey Ripinsky, Venezuela’s Withdrawal from ICSID: 
What it Does and Does Not Achieve, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. (Apr. 13, 2012), 
https://www.iisd.org/itn/2012/04/13/venezuelas-withdrawal-from-icsid-what-it-does-
and-does-not-achieve/ [https://perma.cc/7NLA-JDBF] (archived Jan. 20, 2017). 
 19. UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor–State 
Arbitration, U.N. Doc. A/RES/68/109 (Apr. 1, 2014), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/ 
texts/arbitration/rules-on-transparency/Rules-on-Transparency-E.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
5KHH-YXVB] (archived Jan. 21, 2017) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency]. 
 20. See UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, U.N. Doc. A/RES/65/22, art. 1(4) (Jan. 10, 
2011), https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules-revised/arb-rules-
revised-2010-e.pdf [https://perma.cc/8ZQQ-V27C] (archived Jan. 21, 2017) (“[F]or 
investor–State arbitration initiated pursuant to a treaty providing for the protection of 
investments or investors, these Rules include the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in 
Treaty-based Investor–State Arbitration . . . subject to article 1 of the Rules on 
Transparency.”). 
 21. See United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor–
State Arbitration, opened for signature Mar. 17, 2015, http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/ 
texts/arbitration/transparency-convention/Transparency-Convention-e.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
HK2M-KHY4] (archived Jan. 20, 2017) [hereinafter Mauritius Convention on 
Transparency]. 
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experience,22 ethics rules,23 and codes of conduct for arbitrators.24 On 
a broader scale, to address the apparent legitimacy crisis in investment 
treaty arbitration,25 the European Commission took the lead in 
proposing structural changes to ISDS. Most radically, it now proposes 
to replace ISDS with a permanent two-tier system of international 
investment courts.26 The free trade agreements (FTAs) of the 
European Union with Canada27 and Vietnam28 are the first examples 
of treaties that contain provisions for such an investment court system 
instead of traditional ISDS. 
 In addition, to protect their regulatory space and limit exposure to 
regulatory disputes in ISDS, states have turned to more careful treaty 
drafting. First, they seek to limit potential ISDS claims by revoking or 
clarifying the scope of investor protection obligations under IIAs. 
Second, they seek to secure for themselves in the IIA regime the 
regulatory space for domestic policymaking. To do so, state parties 
                                                                                                                       
 22. See, e.g., Free Trade Agreement, China-Austl., art. 9.15, ¶ 8, June 17, 2015, 
http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/chafta/official-documents/Documents/chafta-chapter-
9-investment.pdf [https://perma.cc/MHC5-6XNE] (archived Jan. 22, 2017) (“All 
arbitrators appointed pursuant to this Section shall have expertise or experience in 
public international law, international trade or international investment rules, or the 
resolution of disputes arising under international trade or international investment 
agreements.”) [hereinafter ChAFTA]. 
 23. See, e.g., Free Trade Agreement, EU-Viet., ch. 8, ch. 2, §3, art. 14 (Agreed text 
as of Jan. 2016), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/february/tradoc_154210.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P6JF-PAEC] (archived Jan. 22, 2017) [hereinafter EU-Vietnam FTA]. 
 24. See, e.g., ChAFTA, supra note 22, ch. 9, Annex 9-A (containing a code of 
conduct for arbitrators appointed pursuant to the investment chapter of ChAFTA). See 
also Free Trade Agreement, EU-Sing., Annex 9-F (Agreed text as of Feb. 2016), 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/june/tradoc_153580.pdf [https://perma.cc/E9BY-
Z9AM] (archived Jan. 22, 2017) (providing a Code of Conduct for Arbitrators and 
Mediators) [hereinafter EUSFTA]. 
 25. See Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: 
Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1521, 1568 (2005) (suggesting that contradictory awards in ISDS undermine “the 
legitimacy of investment arbitration, particularly where public international law rights 
are at stake and the legitimate expectations of investors and Sovereigns are 
mismanaged”). 
 26. See Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, Commission Proposes New Investment Court 
System for TTIP and Other EU Trade and Investment Negotiations (Sept. 16, 2015), 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5651_en.htm [https://perma.cc/YY4P-M4EH] 
(archived Feb. 1, 2017); see also Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, EU Finalises Proposal for 
Investment Protection and Court System for TTIP (Nov. 12, 2015), http://europa.eu/rapid/ 
press-release_IP-15-6059_en.htm [https://perma.cc/9U6L-MXKY] (archived Feb. 11, 
2017); Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, Trade in Services, Investment 
and E-Commerce, Ch. II, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/november/tradoc_ 
153955.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z4V9-PPL5] (archived Jan. 20, 2017) (for text of the EU’s 
Proposal for Investment Protection and Resolution of Investment Disputes). 
 27. Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, Can.-EU, arts. 8.27-.28 
(Final text, Feb. 2016), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/february/tradoc_154329 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/8NXY-Q5PH] (archived Jan. 22, 2017) [hereinafter CETA]. 
 28. EU-Vietnam FTA, supra note 23, arts. 12–13. 
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increasingly incorporate into the treaty text a reference to the right to 
regulate as a rationale for various exceptions and exclusions, non-
precluded measures, and deviations from investor protection 
obligations. In ISDS, these provisions give an arbitral tribunal a legal 
avenue to consider and weigh a state’s regulatory interests against the 
rights of foreign investors. And third, sovereign states continue to look 
for new ways to limit the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals over 
regulatory disputes. The tobacco carve-out of the TPP29 provides the 
most innovative solution to the jurisdictional puzzle yet. This unique 
provision—a breakthrough by some accounts30—gives a state party to 
the TPP the option to revoke the benefits of ISDS with respect to claims 
challenging a state’s tobacco control measures. 
 But can the tobacco carve-out strike the long-sought balance 
between the state’s regulatory interests and investor protection rights, 
ensuring that a state can freely regulate? It is highly unlikely. The 
tobacco carve-out on its own does not reserve for the state the right to 
regulate the production, marketing, use, or consumption of tobacco. It 
only seeks to ensure that a state can avoid ISDS on a case-by-case basis 
with respect to claims challenging its tobacco control measures. 
Consequently, the tobacco carve-out does not remove substantive 
investor protection obligations, but simply eliminates one of the forums 
for investment treaty claims. To ensure that a state can freely regulate 
in view of its investor protection obligations, an alternative solution is 
needed. 
 At the heart of the regulatory disputes problem is the tension 
between the public and private interests and the question of setting 
priorities between the rights of sovereign states and those of foreign 
investors. The borderline between these priorities has shifted over the 
years. At the birth of trade liberalization and investment agreements 
in the second half of the twentieth century, governments were willing 
to compromise on their sovereignty in hopes of promoting trade, 
attracting foreign investments, and driving economic development. 
Once their economic and development priorities changed, however, 
states began revising and rebalancing their investor protection 
regimes. In addition, countries like China—a predominantly capital 
importer in the earlier days of IIAs, but a growing capital exporter 
today—sought to balance their newly found interests as capital 
exporters with their desire to retain sovereignty and the power to 
regulate as the host state. 
 Along the way, governments and public interest groups have 
begun seeing investment treaty tribunals as protectors of the private 
interests of foreign corporations. Composed of foreign individuals, far 
                                                                                                                       
 29. TPP, supra note 3, art. 29.5. 
 30. See, e.g., Sergio Puig & Gregory Shaffer, A Breakthrough with the TPP: The 
Tobacco Carve-Out, 16 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 327 (2016). 
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removed from the realities of the host state they are called upon to 
judge, arbitrators are no longer trusted with the public policy decisions. 
Understandably, scholars have also expressed concerns over the 
“privatization” of international law.31 In a pendulum movement, there 
is today is a massive push for the “nationalization” of ISDS, which, 
from a procedural point of view, remains largely a private dispute 
resolution method. 
 The most evident effort to convert ISDS into a public dispute 
resolution method is the call to replace ISDS with a system of 
international investment courts.32 Similarly, countries that have 
terminated their BITs or exited the ICSID Convention33 have urged 
foreign investors to bring any investment claims to their domestic 
courts.34 Further, various transparency initiatives have also been 
implemented in the name of the public interest, making the general 
public not only aware of a dispute, but also directly involved in the 
proceeding through amicus curiae submissions.35 The logic behind 
these efforts is to move away from private dispute resolution back to 
public dispute resolution since only public judicial bodies are now 
perceived as able to make public policy determinations. The TPP 
tobacco carve-out that deprives arbitral tribunals of the jurisdiction 
over tobacco control measures is the latest example of efforts to move 
investment treaty claims back into the domain of public dispute 
resolution.36 
 Against the logic of these efforts, a better way to address concerns 
over regulatory disputes is to structure ISDS as a mix of both 
systems—an investor–state arbitration under procedural rules of 
international commercial arbitration, supplemented by the possibility 
of limited court review. After all, the ideal dispute resolution 
mechanism will be called upon to decide on hybrid37 disputes—
disputes involving private interests of foreign investors allegedly 
harmed by government regulatory measures—and so it is only logical 
                                                                                                                       
 31. See generally Franck, supra note 25 (warning against looming legitimacy crisis 
in investment treaty arbitration due to inconsistent decisions by private arbitral 
tribunals affecting public international law and the rights of sovereign states). 
 32. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing the European 
Commission’s proposal to install a permanent international investment court system). 
 33. ICSID Convention, supra note 18. 
 34. See, e.g., Cecilia Malmström, Proposing an Investment Court System, 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Sept. 16, 2015), http://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/ 
malmstrom/blog/proposing-investment-court-system_en [https://perma.cc/4CMW-RLPF] 
(archived Jan. 20, 2017). 
 35. See supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text for various legal instruments 
that have been adopted to date to increase transparency in ISDS. 
 36. TPP, supra note 3, art. 29.5 (containing the TPP tobacco carve-out provision). 
 37. See Zachary Douglas, The Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty 
Arbitration, 74 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 151 (2003) (discussing the hybrid origin of investor–
state arbitration). 
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to look for a hybrid institutional and procedural solution to the 
mechanism of resolving such disputes. 
 The goal of this Article is twofold. First, the Article explains the 
essence of the concerns about regulatory disputes in modern ISDS. In 
doing so, it explores the concept of the “right to regulate,” which allows 
a host state to adopt measures for legitimate public policy objectives 
that deviate from the state’s investor protection obligations. The 
Article also surveys the contours of the right to regulate, as provided 
by exceptions, exclusions, carve-outs, and other safeguard provisions 
in international investment law. Second, the Article critically 
examines the tobacco carve-out and other safeguard provisions in the 
TPP and suggests a more appropriate solution for ensuring that a state 
can freely regulate, and, should a dispute arise, that a state can resolve 
it through ISDS that is amenable to both private interests and public 
policy considerations. 
 The Article proceeds as follows: Part II provides an overview of 
modern international investment law and dispute resolution, with a 
focus on the nature and general criticism of the ISDS regime. Part III 
explores the issue of regulatory disputes in investor–state arbitration 
by explaining the concept of the “right to regulate” and summarizing 
the major criticism of ISDS—that it allows foreign corporations to 
challenge legitimate government measures. Part IV first provides 
insights into the various structural and procedural changes to ISDS to 
date and summarizes how safeguard provisions can be used in IIAs to 
reserve the right to regulate. It then critically examines the tobacco 
carve-out and related provisions in the TPP and offers alternative 
solutions to challenges incident to investor–state arbitration of 
regulatory disputes. A short conclusion follows. 
II. MODERN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION 
A. The Network of International Investment Agreements 
 International investment law encompasses a network of over 
thirty-three hundred IIAs seeking to attract and promote foreign 
investments in state parties.38 Having largely emerged as BITs, today 
IIAs also include multilateral and bilateral FTAs with investment 
chapters, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement 
                                                                                                                       
 38. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2016, 
INVESTOR NATIONALITY: POLICY CHALLENGES xii (2016) [hereinafter WORLD 
INVESTMENT REPORT 2016] (“In 2015, 31 new IIAs were concluded, bringing the universe 
to 3,304 treaties by year-end . . . . By the end of May 2016, close to 150 economies were 
engaged in negotiating at least 57 new IIAs.”). 
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(NAFTA)39 and, more recently, the EU-Canada Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA)40 and the China-Australia 
Free Trade Agreement (ChAFTA)41; sector specific agreements, such 
as the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT)42; and now also “mega-regional” 
trade and investment agreements, such as the signed TPP and the 
proposed TTIP. Modern BITs and investment chapters in FTAs largely 
follow the same structure. First, they provide foreign investors with a 
combination of investor protection obligations, such as non-
discrimination, fair and equitable treatment (FET), full protection and 
security (FPS), and protection against expropriation. Second, for 
disputes related to an alleged breach of the above investor protection 
obligations, IIAs may also provide for ISDS, most commonly, investor–
state arbitration. These two types of provisions are referred to in this 
Article as substantive and procedural investor protection obligations, 
respectively. 
 In recent years, the IIA regime has become the subject of criticism 
by politicians, lawyers, economists, and civil society groups. They point 
out that the role of IIAs in promoting investments, trade, and 
development among participating countries remains unclear.43 Yet the 
burden of entering into trade liberalization and investment protection 
agreements with ISDS provisions can be significant. For sovereign 
governments, such agreements, and the resulting investment disputes, 
may impede the ability to regulate and lead to multimillion dollar 
damages awards against states.44 For local businesses, there is the 
                                                                                                                       
 39. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 
[hereinafter NAFTA]. 
 40. CETA, supra note 27. 
 41. See ChAFTA, supra note 22, ch. 9. 
 42. Energy Charter Treaty, opened for signature Dec. 17, 1994, 2080 U.N.T.S. 
95, http://www.energycharter.org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/Legal/ECTC-en.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/W7YA-2L99] (archived Jan. 22, 2017) [hereinafter ECT]. 
 43. See, e.g., Arjan Lejour & Maria Salfi, The Regional Impact of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment (CPB Netherlands Bureau for 
Economic Policy Analysis, CPB Discussion Paper 298, Jan. 16, 2015), 
http://www.cpb.nl/en/publication/the-regional-impact-of-bilateral-investment-treaties-
on-foreign-direct-investment [https://perma.cc/PJ2F-QYPQ] (archived Feb. 11, 2017) 
(showing that there might be benefits of BITs for lower and middle income countries, but 
not to high income countries, although there are observable differences among world 
regions). 
 44. The ability of foreign investors to interfere with the government’s ability to 
regulate is often discussed as part of the chilling effect argument. In particular, it has 
been argued that governments may react to investor–state arbitrations or the threat of 
claims by foreign investors by adopting less than optimal level of regulation. For further 
discussion, see note 16 and the accompanying text. Damages awarded to foreign 
investors in ISDS may range from several million to hundreds of millions of dollars, with 
the largest award ever rendered reaching as high as $50 billion. See U.N. CONFERENCE 
ON TRADE AND DEV., INVESTOR–STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: REVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS 
IN 2015. IIA ISSUES NOTE II 6 (2016) (reporting that in 2015 “[t]en decisions awarded 
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threat of being unable to compete with foreign multinational 
corporations and of going out of business. For local communities, 
investment projects often entail the arrival of foreign companies that 
operate without regard for community values, local customs, 
traditions, development needs, and—as failed investment projects 
have demonstrated—without having to deal with the disastrous 
environmental and health impact.45 Understandably, international 
investment treaty making today requires persuading governments and 
other stakeholders that the benefits of trade liberalization outweigh its 
costs. 
 The debate on the future of the IIA regime is particularly heated 
now because of a new trend in treaty making: the conclusion of 
unprecedentedly large trade liberalization treaties—the mega-regional 
trade agreements, or the so-called mega-regionals. The TPP46 was 
signed by twelve Pacific Rim countries that have a total GDP of about 
$28 trillion and a combined population of nearly 817 million (over 37.6 
percent of the world’s GDP and over 11.1 percent of the world 
population as of 2015).47 Together with the United States, it could have 
become the largest FTA ever concluded, accounting for more than a 
third of the world trade.48 The CETA, which was recently approved by 
the European Parliament,49 would cover economies with a total GDP 
of nearly $18 trillion and a combined population of over 545 million as 
                                                                                                                       
compensation to the investor, ranging from $8.6 million to $383.6 million. The average 
amount awarded was $120.2 million and the median $48.6 million”). 
 45. See, e.g., Chevron Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2009-23, 
(UNCITRAL 2009), http://www.italaw.com/cases/257 [https://perma.cc/8W68-JRNH] 
(archived Jan. 22, 2017) (involving allegations of severe environmental pollution and 
health damage resulting from Texaco/Chevron operations in the Amazon region of 
Ecuador). 
 46. TPP, supra note 3. 
 47. See GDP at Market Prices (current US$), WORLD BANK DATA 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD (last visited Apr. 8, 2017)  
[https://perma.cc/Q482-4T6F] (archived Mar. 6, 2017) [hereinafter GDP, Total] 
(calculating a total GDP by adding the 2015 GDPs of the twelve countries that signed 
the TPP, including the United States). Percentage of the world GDP for the TPP, as well 
as the CETA and the TTIP mentioned below, were calculated using the 2015 world GDP 
of 74.152 trillion U.S. dollars. Id. Population, Total, WORLD BANK DATA 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL [https://perma.cc/9XVC-TJ3K] (archived 
Mar. 6, 2017) [hereinafter Population, Total] (calculating the population covered by TPP 
by adding the 2015 populations of the countries covered by the agreement). Percentage 
of the world GDP for the TPP, CETA and the TTIP were calculated using the 2015 world 
population of 7.347 billion. Id. 
 48. See Kevin Granville, This Was the Trans-Pacific Partnership, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 11, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/business/tpp-explained-
what-is-trans-pacific-partnership.html [https://perma.cc/W5JJ-LNAG] (archived Jan. 22, 
2017). Note, however, that the projected influence of the TPP included the United States, 
which since has begun its withdrawal from the treaty. 
 49. CETA, supra note 27; see In Focus: EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and 
Trade Agreement (CETA), EUR. COMM’N, (Jan. 16, 2017), http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/ 
in-focus/ceta/ [https://perma.cc/R6XV-7UB4] (archived Jan. 17, 2017). 
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of 2015 (over 24.1 percent of the world’s GDP and over 7.4 percent of 
the world population as of 2015).50 The proposed TTIP51 between the 
United States and the European Union would affect countries with a 
total GDP of over $34 trillion and a combined population of 831 million 
(over 46.3 percent of the world GDP and 11.3 percent of the world 
population as of 2015).52 The importance of these trade liberalization 
treaties is hard to understate. It also explains the contentiousness of 
the debates in negotiating and drafting modern IIAs, most notably, 
with regard to their ISDS provisions. 
B. The Nature and Criticism of the ISDS Regime 
 As an international law instrument, ISDS allows a foreign 
investor to bring a claim—commonly in investor–state arbitration—
against the host state for violation of its IIA obligations. States agree 
to arbitral jurisdiction by giving consent to investor–state arbitration 
in IIAs, in domestic legislation, or in investment contracts. The right 
to file a claim in ISDS is rarely conditioned on the exhaustion of local 
remedies, such as filing a case in local courts or satisfying other 
domestic legal remedies under host state law. In this sense, IIAs 
operate like contracts for the benefit of third parties. Although they are 
concluded by sovereign states, IIAs provide third-party beneficiaries—
the foreign investors—with the rights that are directly enforceable in 
international arbitration against state parties. 
 Scholars have struggled to advance a single theory of ISDS, often 
drawing analogies to contract law, international law, and 
constitutional law.53 Most notably, Gus Van Harten and Martin 
                                                                                                                       
 50. See GDP, Total, supra note 47 (calculating a total GDP of the CETA countries 
by adding the 2015 GDPs of Canada and the twenty-eight Member States of the 
European Union); Population, Total, supra note 47 (calculating the population covered 
by the CETA by adding the 2015 populations of Canada and the European Union). 
 51. TTIP, supra note 6. 
 52. See GDP, Total, supra note 47 (calculating a total GDP of the proposed TTIP 
by adding the 2015 GDPs of the United States and the twenty-eight Member States of 
the European Union); Population, Total, supra note 47 (calculating the population 
covered by the TTIP by adding the 2015 populations of the United States and the 
European Union). 
 53. See, e.g., Anthea Roberts, Triangular Treaties: The Extent and Limits of 
Investment Treaty Rights, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 353 (2015) (proposing “a new triangular 
framework that draws on principles from public international law, third-party 
beneficiary doctrines, and public law in a way that captures the unique, hybrid nature 
of investment treaties”); Richard C. Chen, A Contractual Approach to Investor–State 
Regulatory Disputes, 40 YALE J. INT’L L. 295, 295–335 (2015); Van Harten & Loughlin, 
supra note 13, at 121 (suggesting an analogy to domestic administrative law is more 
fitting than an analogy to international commercial arbitration); Anthea Roberts, Clash 
of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty System, 107 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 45 (2013) (using various frameworks and analogies to help foster understanding 
of the “clash of paradigms” underlying the investment treaty system); Douglas, supra 
note 37, at 152–55. 
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Loughlin have developed the theory of global administrative law, 
arguing that the right to initiate a claim in investor–state arbitration 
is analogous to judicial review of the state’s regulatory acts in domestic 
courts.54 In developing their theory, they first identified four specific 
features of investment treaty arbitration, namely, (1) the authorization 
in IIAs of individual claims by foreign investors against host states, (2) 
the expanded reach of investment arbitration as an “international 
mechanism of adjudicative review” through forum shopping facilitated 
by IIA, (3) the availability of claims for damages against host states, 
and (4) the direct enforcement of awards in domestic courts 
worldwide.55 They further observed that the cumulative effect of these 
features is “to subject the regulatory conduct of states to control 
through compulsory international adjudication to an unusual 
extent.”56 Consequently, they argued that, because of the potential of 
this international mechanism to “exert a strong disciplinary influence 
over domestic administrative programmes . . . investment arbitration 
should be seen to constitute a powerful species of global administrative 
law.”57 
 Procedurally, ISDS is, of course, most similar to international 
commercial arbitration. In fact, investor protection agreements often 
allow a foreign investor to submit its claim to arbitration using the 
rules of international commercial arbitration, such as the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules.58 Beyond these rules, the parties may arbitrate by 
relying on the ICSID Convention and the ICSID Rules on Procedure 
for Arbitration Proceedings or the ICSID Additional Facility Rules.59 
 Over the years, the ISDS regime has been criticized for the 
shortcomings of a number of its features.60 For instance, the ISDS 
system is notoriously one-sided in its design. It provides a foreign 
investor—but not a host state—with a right to sue and a right to choose 
                                                                                                                       
 54. See, e.g., Van Harten & Loughlin, supra note 13, at 121, 140 (“Investment 
arbitration is constituted by a sovereign act, as opposed to a private act, of the state and 
this . . . . makes investment arbitration more closely analogous to domestic juridical 
review of the regulatory conduct of the state.”). See generally Benedict Kingsbury et al., 
The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (2005) 
(discussing the factors encouraging and those constraining the development of global 
administrative law). 
 55. Van Harten & Loughlin, supra note 13, at 122. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See, e.g., TPP, supra note 3, art. 9.19 ¶ 4(c) (listing the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules as an alternative under which the claimant may submit a claim). 
 59. See, e.g., TPP, supra note 3, art. 9.19 ¶¶ 4(a)–(b) (listing the ICSID Convention 
and the ICSID Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings, as well as the ICSID 
Additional Facility Rules, as alternatives under which the claimant may submit a claim). 
 60. See, e.g., Fact Sheet: Investment Protection and Investor-to-State Dispute 
Settlement in EU Agreements, EUR. COMM’N (2013), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/html/ 
151916.htm [https://perma.cc/9QRY-WYFM] (archived Jan. 22, 2017) (addressing 
imperfections of the current system of ISDS in IIAs). 
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the arbitration mechanism. More specifically, with the exception of 
rarely permitted counterclaims, ISDS gives the right to bring a claim 
to foreign investors, but not to the host state.61 The choice of 
arbitration rules and procedure is similarly given to foreign investors, 
who can select a particular arbitration mechanism from the list of 
options available under an investment protection treaty.62 Moreover, 
in IIAs, parties give an offer of consent to ISDS with any and all foreign 
investors granted protection under a treaty.63 Hence, the state does not 
know in advance if and when an investment arbitration will be 
commenced against it, or which of its investors will choose to perfect 
the ISDS consent. Consequently, foreign investors always get the first-
mover advantage in investment dispute resolution. 
 Despite such imbalance between the rights of foreign investors 
and the rights of the host state, governments reportedly win more often 
than foreign investors in investor–state arbitrations if wins at the 
jurisdictional and the merits phase are combined together.64 Yet, to 
win a case, a host state is required to defend itself in an investor–state 
arbitration. This is a very costly endeavor for many states, requiring, 
on average, $4.5 million in defense costs in addition to about $373,200 
in tribunal costs (if tribunal costs are split equally between parties).65 
                                                                                                                       
 61. See, e.g., 2012 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 12, art. 1 (defining “claimant” as “an 
investor of a Party that is a party to an investment dispute with the other Party”). See 
also TPP, supra note 3, art. 9.19; CETA, supra note 27, art. 8.23; NAFTA, supra note 39, 
art. 1120. 
 62. 2012 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 12, art. 9.19 ¶ 4(c); TPP, supra note 3, 
art. 9.19 ¶ 4; CETA, supra note 27, art. 8.23 ¶ 2; NAFTA, supra note 39, art. 1120. 
 63. By their design, IIAs are treaties for the benefit of the third party—foreign 
investor. As such, IIAs provide protection under the treaty to all investors and/or 
investments that fall within the scope of the treaty. 
 64. Most recently, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) reported that out of total 444 ISDS proceedings concluded by the end of 2015, 
about one third was decided in favor of the state and about one quarter—in favor of the 
investor. See WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2016, supra note 38, at 107. UNCTAD further 
reports that about one half of cases that ended in favor of the state were dismissed for 
the lack of jurisdiction. Id. Out of the decisions on the merits, states won only 40 percent 
of cases, while 60 percent of cases were decided in favor of foreign investors. Id. 
 65. Counting the Cost of Investment Treaty Arbitration, GLOBAL ARB. REV. 
(Mar. 24, 2014), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/32513/ [https://perma. 
cc/D8ZW-ZCWT] (archived Jan. 16, 2017) (describing an Allen & Overy study of 176 
investment treaty arbitration cases with data showing that “the average party costs were 
quite similar, at US$4,437,000 for claimants and US$4,559,000 for respondents” and 
that “the average [tribunal] costs are US$746,000 (median US$590,000), or just over 
US$373,200 for each party (split on a 50:50 basis)”). A more recent study of 138 ICSID 
arbitrations concluded in the period of July 1, 2010 to June 30, 2015, revealed higher 
costs of, on average, $5,619,261.74 for claimants and $4,954,461.27 for respondents, in 
addition to $882,668.19 in tribunal costs. See Jeffery P. Commission, How Much Does an 
ICSID Arbitration Cost? A Snapshot of the Last Five Years, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Feb. 29, 
2016), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2016/02/29/how-much-does-an-icsid-arbitration-
cost-a-snapshot-of-the-last-five-years/ [https://perma.cc/FVV4-M9T6] (archived Mar. 19, 
2017). 
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 Other shortcomings of ISDS include the lack of transparency and 
the absence of an appeals mechanism that would ensure secondary 
review, consistency, and predictability in arbitral awards.66 
Furthermore, ISDS has been criticized for its reliance on private 
arbitrators instead of professional judges with training and experience 
in international law.67 Relatedly, investor–state arbitrators are often 
suspected of bias and self-interest.68 Critics of ISDS further attest that, 
in borderline cases, private arbitrators have a tendency to establish 
jurisdiction in order to hear a case and receive remuneration for their 
work.69 Some arbitrators are even accused of always voting for the 
state or always voting for the foreign investor, allegedly to secure 
future appointments by claimants or defendants.70 These concerns 
about the legitimacy of ISDS have become common arguments in the 
debate on the future of ISDS.71 
 Additionally, critics of ISDS point out that, through the most-
favored-nation (MFN) clause and corporate reorganizations, the 
investment law regime promotes socially wasteful treaty and forum 
                                                                                                                       
 66. See, e.g., U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV., REFORM OF INVESTOR–STATE 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: IN SEARCH OF A ROADMAP, 3–4 (June 26, 2013) (listing the lack of 
sufficient legitimacy, transparency, and consistency in arbitral decisions among the 
main concerns in current ISDS regime). 
 67. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Clause Everyone 
Should Oppose, WASH. POST (Feb. 23, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ 
kill-the-dispute-settlement-language-in-the-trans-pacific-partnership/2015/02/25/ 
ec7705a2-bd1e-11e4-b274-e5209a3bc9a9_story.html?utm_term=.f60d2389166b 
[https://perma.cc/XW7S-W2JM] (archived Mar. 6, 2017) (“ISDS could lead to gigantic 
fines, but it wouldn’t employ independent judges. Instead, highly paid corporate lawyers 
would go back and forth between representing corporations one day and sitting in 
judgment the next. Maybe that makes sense in an arbitration between two corporations, 
but not in cases between corporations and governments. If you’re a lawyer looking to 
maintain or attract high-paying corporate clients, how likely are you to rule against 
those corporations when it’s your turn in the judge’s seat?”). 
 68. Id. 
 69. See, e.g., PIA EBERHARDT ET AL., PROFITING FROM INJUSTICE: HOW LAW FIRMS, 
ARBITRATORS AND FINANCIERS ARE FUELLING AN INVESTMENT ARBITRATION BOOM 35 
(Helen Burley ed., 2012) (observing that “[a]rbitrators, to a far greater degree than 
judges, have a financial and professional stake in the system. They earn handsome 
rewards for their services. Unlike judges, there is no flat salary, no cap on financial 
remuneration. Arbitrators’ fees can range from US $375 to US $700 per hour depending 
on where the arbitration takes place. How much an arbitrator earns per case will depend 
on the case’s length and complexity, but for a US$100 million dispute, arbitrators could 
earn on average up to US $350,000.” (footnotes omitted)). In addition, in a relatively 
small world of arbitrators acting in ISDS, there are reputation concerns that may 
motivate arbitrators to perform their functions with a view of securing future 
appointments. 
 70. Daphna Kapeliuk, Collegial Games: Analyzing the Effect of Panel Composition 
on Outcome in Investment Arbitration, 31 REV. LITIG. 267, 278 (2012). 
 71. See generally Franck, supra note 25 (discussing solutions to challenges facing 
investment treaty arbitration). 
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shopping.72 Another problem of ISDS is that a challenged regulatory 
measure may be covered by several treaties or chapters of the 
agreement (e.g., trade and investment chapters), which allows a 
foreign investor not only to forum shop for a more preferential treaty 
and jurisdiction, but also to use the benefits of several treaties. 
Commentators have also criticized ISDS for providing multinational 
corporations with the power to sue sovereign governments, interfering 
with the state’s power to regulate.73 And some have expressed general 
skepticism about the ability of private arbitrators to address complex 
disputes with public policy implications.74 
 Dissatisfaction with ISDS is fueled by the fact that it is still 
unclear whether IIAs contribute to attracting foreign investments to a 
country.75 Thus, the benefits of foreign investment protection regimes 
for the economic development of host states remain contentious. This 
is a concern because opening up to foreign investors and providing a 
consent to ISDS in IIAs may lead to costly investor–state arbitrations. 
Some countries have therefore chosen to revoke their ISDS consent or 
reconsider investment protection regimes.76 Despite all of this, 
                                                                                                                       
 72. See, e.g., ROOS VAN OS & ROELINE KNOTTNERUS, DUTCH BILATERAL 
INVESTMENT TREATIES: A GATEWAY TO ‘TREATY SHOPPING’ FOR INVESTMENT PROTECTION 
BY MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES 31 (2011) (discussing “treaty shopping” and how Dutch 
BITs are used by multinational corporations to sue sovereign governments in ISDS); see, 
e.g., LISE JOHNSON ET AL., COLUM. CTR. ON SUSTAINABLE INV., INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT, PUBLIC INTEREST AND U.S. DOMESTIC LAW 11–14 (2015) (explaining that 
forum shopping is used to gain access to ISDS). 
 73. See Claire Provost & Matt Kennard, The Obscure Legal System That Lets 
Corporations Sue Countries, GUARDIAN (June 10, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
business/2015/jun/10/obscure-legal-system-lets-corportations-sue-states-ttip-icsid 
[https://perma.cc/H8W3-7RBQ] (archived Jan. 16, 2017) (noting that “[t]here was sharp 
opposition to this [ISDS] system from its inception, with a bloc of developing countries 
warning that it would undermine their sovereignty”). 
 74. See, e.g., William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Private Litigation in 
a Public Law Sphere: The Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitrations, 35 YALE J. 
INT’L L. 283, 336 (2010) (“The inherent problem with ICSID tribunals . . . . is that they 
are not well positioned or equipped to engage in lawmaking, to internalize the context, 
and to weigh the policy considerations at play in a particular case . . . . ICSID arbitrators 
are far removed from the polities over whom they exercise control. They often lack 
expertise in the particular circumstances and fact patterns of the case.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 75. See, e.g., Jason Webb Yackee, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote 
Foreign Direct Investment? Some Hints from Alternative Evidence, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 397 
(2010) (questioning generally whether international investment agreements attract 
foreign investments); U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV., The Impact of 
International Investment Agreements on Foreign Direct Investment: An Overview of 
Empirical Studies 1998-2004 (Working Draft 2014) (discussing the impact of IIAs on 
foreign investment). 
 76. A number of sovereign states have cancelled their investment protection 
treaties. Examples include South Africa (which has terminated its BITs with Austria, 
Belgium and Luxembourg, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, 
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom), Indonesia (which to date has terminated 
fourteen of its BITs), Italy (which announced its withdrawal from the ECT with a notice 
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however, ISDS continues to play an important role in the 
interpretation and enforcement of the provisions of international 
investment agreements. 
III. REGULATORY DISPUTES IN INVESTOR–STATE ARBITRATION 
A. The Right to Regulate in International Investment Law 
 Of particular concern to the critics of ISDS are the so-called 
regulatory disputes. Regulatory disputes are investor–state disputes 
that challenge government measures and, as such, may have a chilling 
effect on the state’s power to regulate. The ability to regulate within 
its own borders is a core feature of the sovereign state. Through its 
legislative, administrative, and judicial bodies, the state is generally 
free to adopt, maintain, and enforce the measures necessary for the 
advancement of its public policy goals. Government regulation is thus 
understood broadly and may include any act of the legislature, public 
administration, or courts that is an exercise of the regulatory or police 
power of the state. It is also in the expression of the right to regulate 
that a state may enter into international investment treaties and, in 
doing so, undertake investor protection obligations. 
 The words to regulate, regulatory, and regulation are increasingly 
common in modern IIAs that seek to reserve for the state the right to 
regulate for the public interest. Investor protection treaties 
acknowledge a number of legitimate public policy goals, such as the 
protection of public health, the environment, competition, human 
rights, and social values.77 
 Most commonly, the right to regulate is invoked in IIAs as part of 
the general exceptions. General exceptions are treaty provisions that 
allow the state to adopt measures that deviate from its investor 
protection obligations. Consequently, investment law scholars have 
                                                                                                                       
to the ECT Secretariat in January 2015). See generally International Investment 
Agreements Navigator, U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV. (Jan. 31, 2017), http:// 
investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA [https://perma.cc/7EC8-7RZU] (archived Feb. 1, 2017). 
 77. See, e.g., TPP, supra note 3, art. 9.16 (“Nothing in this Chapter shall be 
construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining or enforcing any measure 
otherwise consistent with this Chapter that it considers appropriate to ensure that 
investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to 
environmental, health or other regulatory objectives” (emphasis added)); see also EU-
Vietnam FTA, supra note 23, § 2, art. 13bis (“1. The Parties reaffirm the right to regulate 
within their territories to achieve legitimate policy objectives, such as the protection of 
public health, safety, environment or public morals, social or consumer protection or 
promotion and protection of cultural diversity. 2. For greater certainty, the provisions of 
this section shall not be interpreted as a commitment from a Party that it will not change 
the legal and regulatory framework, including in a manner that may negatively affect 
the operation of covered investments or the investor’s expectations of profits.” (emphasis 
added)). 
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suggested a more narrow definition of the right to regulate that reflects 
the specific understanding of such a right under investor protection 
treaties. For instance, Aikaterini Titi has defined the right to regulate 
in international investment law as “the legal right exceptionally 
permitting the host state to regulate in derogation of international 
commitments it has undertaken by means of an investment agreement 
without incurring a duty to compensate.”78 However, in the public 
policy debate over the legitimacy of ISDS, the right to regulate is 
generally used in its broadest sense. Most frequently, it is invoked to 
express concerns over constraints that investor protection obligations 
impose on the state’s regulatory power in its domestic policymaking. 
 Similarly, the concept of public interest is relatively new for IIAs. 
Scholars have noted that earlier investor protection treaties and other 
legal instruments did not contain references to the public interest.79 
Instead, these legal instruments employed “narrower categories such 
as ‘government’ or ‘consumer’ interests, or juxtapose[d] the public 
interest and private sector interests, mingling the first order objective 
with the second-order trade-offs required to attain it.”80 The latest 
generation of IIAs employ the term public interest generously. For 
instance, investor protection treaties allow state parties to expropriate 
only for a public purpose.81 Furthermore, general exceptions name 
public interest as a ground for adopting regulatory measures that 
would otherwise be in breach of the IIAs provisions. The exceptions do 
not define public interest, but frequently list several legitimate 
regulatory objectives that allow the state to exercise its right to 
regulate despite its investor protection obligations. 
 In international investment law, the right to regulate manifests 
itself in several ways. First, one might see a reference to the right to 
regulate in the preamble of international investment treaties.82 The 
role of such provisions is usually to establish a general regime for 
contracting parties and to explain the reasons for entering into a 
treaty, but not necessarily to create legal obligations for them. Yet 
preamble provisions are frequently invoked by the host state in 
international arbitration to support the state’s claim that investor 
protection obligations are not absolute. Such preamble provisions 
                                                                                                                       
 78. AIKATERINI TITI, THE RIGHT TO REGULATE IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
LAW 33 (2014). 
 79. See, e.g., Megan Donaldson & Benedict Kingsbury, Ersatz Normativity or 
Public Law in Global Governance: The Hard Case of International Prescriptions for 
National Infrastructure Regulation, 14 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 1 (2013) (making such observation 
with respect to “formally non-binding but influential instruments issued in the 2000s by 
the World Bank, the OECD, and UNCITRAL” regulating national infrastructure). 
 80. Id. at 27.  
 81. See, e.g., 2012 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 12, art. 6. 
 82. See, e.g., TITI, supra note 78, at 115–22 (discussing the ways international 
investment treaties include the right to regulate in the preamble and providing examples 
of such references across various treaties). 
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reserve for the state the right to regulate for a range of legitimate 
objectives, including public health, safety, the environment, corporate 
social responsibility, and sustainable development.83 
 Second, the right to regulate most noticeably comes into play in 
the context of disputes over indirect—regulatory or creeping—
expropriation.84 Here, the key issue has long been “to what extent a 
government may affect the value of property by regulation, either 
general in nature or by specific actions in the context of general 
regulations, for a legitimate public purpose without effecting a ‘taking’ 
and having to compensate a foreign owner or investor for this act.”85 
Arbitral tribunals have struggled to establish the exact demarcation 
line between indirect expropriation, which, under most IIAs, requires 
adequate compensation, and regulatory measures that do not reach the 
level of expropriation.86 The texts of investor protection treaties often 
contain provisions on regulatory expropriation.87 By contrast, they 
provide little or no guidance to arbitral tribunals in distinguishing such 
actions from regulatory measures not subject to compensation. Rare 
international legal instruments address the possibility that the state 
may regulate without reaching the level of expropriation that requires 
compensation.88 
                                                                                                                       
 83. See id. at 116 (listing public policy objectives from which regulatory interests 
stem). 
 84. See generally Katia Yannaca-Small, Indirect Expropriation and the Right to 
Regulate: How to Draw the Line?, in ARBITRATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
AGREEMENTS: A GUIDE TO THE KEY ISSUES 445–77 (Katia Yannaca-Small ed., 2010) 
(discussing regulation in the instance of expropriation). 
 85. Id. at 446. See also CHRISTOPHER F. DUGAN ET AL., INVESTOR-STATE 
ARBITRATION 452 (2008) (“The signal problem is defining with precision when an exercise 
of regulatory or police power crosses the line and becomes compensable, and a vast 
literature makes it clear that the line is neither bright not clear.” (footnote omitted)). 
 86. See, e.g., Markus Krajewski, Investment Law and Public Services, in 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 1629, 1637 (Marc Bungenberg et al. eds., 2015). 
 87. For instance, the U.S. FTAs with Australia, Chile, Dominican Republic-
Central America, Morocco, Singapore, Peru, and the Model U.S. BIT all contain 
provisions on indirect expropriation. See OECD, “Indirect Expropriation” and the “Right 
to Regulate” in International Investment Law (OECD Working Papers on International 
Investment, Paper No. 2004/04 at 6), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/780155872321 
[https://perma.cc/M2AV-7VZW] (archived Feb. 11, 2017). 
 88. Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, art. 1, Mar. 20, 1952, E.T.S. No. 9 (“Every natural or legal 
person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived 
of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for 
by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall 
not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems 
necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to 
secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”); see also Yannaca-
Small, supra note 84, at 452 (citing to various legal instruments and other texts 
recognizing the state’s right to regulate through recognition of “a category of 
noncompensable takings,” including Article 10(5) of the Harvard Draft Convention on 
the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens, prepared by Harvard 
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 Arbitral tribunals rely on several factors in distinguishing 
legitimate regulation from regulatory expropriation. In Tecmed v. 
Mexico, the tribunal looked at the effect of the regulatory measures and 
the degree to which a foreign investor is deprived by regulation of its 
property or rights, explaining that 
[t]his determination is important because it is one of the main elements to 
distinguish, from the point of view of an international tribunal, between a 
regulatory measure, which is an ordinary expression of the exercise of the state’s 
police power that entails a decrease in assets or rights, and a de facto 
expropriation that deprives those assets and rights of any real substance.89 
 Some tribunals have attempted to distinguish between the two 
types of regulation by looking at their goals, nature, and the manner 
in which they were applied. In doing so, they have relieved the state of 
the obligation to provide compensation where regulation had a 
legitimate public purpose and was applied in a nondiscriminatory 
manner.90 For instance, the arbitral tribunal in Methanex v. United 
States held that 
Methanex [was] correct that an intentionally discriminatory regulation against 
a foreign investor fulfils a key requirement for establishing expropriation. But 
as a matter of general international law, a non-discriminatory regulation for a 
public purpose, which is enacted in accordance with due process and, which 
affects, inter alios, a foreign investor or investment is not deemed expropriatory 
and compensable unless specific commitments had been given by the regulating 
government to the then putative foreign investor contemplating investment that 
the government would refrain from such regulation.91 
                                                                                                                       
Law School under the direction of Professors Louis B. Sohn and R.R. Baxter. OECD Draft 
Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property art. 3, Oct. 16, 1967 (describing plan 
to deal with taking of property); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 
OF THE UNITED STATES cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (defining the limits of expropriation 
and regulation). 
 89. Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. The United Mexican States, ICSID 
Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 115 (May 29, 2003); see also RUDOLF DOLZER & 
MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 100 (1995) (“[I]n determining 
whether a taking constitutes an ‘indirect expropriation’ it is particularly important to 
examine the effect that such taking may have had on the investor’s rights.”). 
 90. Krajewski, supra note 86, at 1638. 
 91. Methanex Corp. v. United States of America, NAFTA (UNCITRAL Rules), 
Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits, Part VI, Ch. D, ¶ 7 (Aug. 3, 
2005) [hereinafter Methanex]; see also Saluka Inv. BV v. The Czech Republic, 
UNCITRAL, Partial Award, ¶ 262 (Mar. 17, 2006) [hereinafter Saluka] (stating that a 
state is not liable for compensation when expropriation is within its police powers). 
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 Other tribunals, such as those in Santa Elena v. Costa Rica92 and 
Metalclad v. Mexico,93 have disagreed that a legitimate public policy 
objective on its own can serve as a justification for expropriation 
without compensation. Similarly, in Azurix v. Argentina, the tribunal 
held that “the issue is not so much whether the measure concerned is 
legitimate and serves a public purpose, but whether it is a measure 
that, being legitimate and serving a public purpose, should give rise to 
a compensation claim.”94 
 Over the years, arbitral tribunals have showed substantial 
deference to the state regulatory power. In doing so, they set a high 
threshold for foreign investors seeking to establish indirect 
expropriation.95 Scholars have identified only a few investor–state 
arbitrations where indirect expropriation was established.96 The effect 
of the regulation has become the most common criteria for 
distinguishing indirect expropriation from legitimate regulation.97 
                                                                                                                       
 92. Compañia del Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. v. The Republic of Costa Rica, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1, Final Award, ¶ 71 (Feb. 17, 2000) (“While an expropriation 
or taking for environmental reasons may be classified as a taking for a public purpose, 
and thus may be legitimate, the fact that the Property was taken for this reason does not 
affect either the nature or the measure of the compensation to be paid for the taking. 
That is, the purpose of protecting the environment for which the Property was taken 
does not alter the legal character of the taking for which adequate compensation must 
be paid. The international source of the obligation to protect the environment makes no 
difference.” (footnote omitted)). 
 93. Metalclad Corp. v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, 
Award, ¶ 111 (Aug. 30, 2000) (“The Tribunal need not decide or consider the motivation 
or intent of the adoption of the Ecological Decree. . . . However, the Tribunal considers 
that the implementation of the Ecological Decree would, in and of itself, constitute an 
act tantamount to expropriation.”). 
 94. Azurix Corp. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, 
¶ 310 (July 14, 2006) (explaining that a legitimate public welfare purpose of regulation 
is not sufficient to allow expropriation without compensation:“[i]n the exercise of their 
public policy function, governments take all sorts of measures that may affect the 
economic value of investments without such measures giving rise to a need to 
compensate. The tribunal in S.D. Myers found the purpose of a regulatory measure a 
helpful criterion to distinguish measures for which a State would not be liable: “Parties 
[to the Bilateral Treaty] are not liable for economic injury that is the consequence of bona 
fide regulation within the accepted police powers of the State. This Tribunal finds the 
criterion insufficient and shares the concern expressed by Judge R. Higgins, who 
questioned whether the difference between expropriation and regulation based on public 
purpose was intellectually viable” (internal citations omitted)).  
 95. See, e.g., Yannaca-Small, supra note 84, at 476 (“Ultimately, however, the 
tribunals have only in a few cases found an indirect expropriation to occur. This results 
from the fact that the threshold for characterizing a governmental measure as 
expropriation is very high.”). 
 96. Id. 
 97. See, e.g., DUGAN ET AL., supra note 85, at 455 (“There is a unanimous 
agreement that one of the most important factors in determining whether a government 
act is an indirect or regulatory expropriation is the effect or the consequences of the 
government act on the investor’s property. In fact, in some arbitrations, the effect is the 
only factor the tribunal has considered.” (footnote omitted)). 
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With regulatory expropriation consistently proving difficult to 
establish, foreign investors then began claiming that host state 
regulation breaches the FET standard.98 
 And so, the third way that the right to regulate manifests itself in 
international investment law is as part of the FET analysis. The right 
to regulate is particularly contentious in this context.99 In contrast to 
the expropriation provisions in IIAs, the FET obligation usually does 
not contain any direct reference to the right to regulate. Consequently, 
it is not clear what standards tribunals are expected to follow in order 
to ensure that foreign companies are not overstepping in their 
demands for investor protection to the detriment of the public interest. 
 Commentators have also noted that the FET analysis often 
necessitates the need to balance the state’s right to regulate against 
the investor’s protection rights.100 Donaldson and Kingsbury have 
argued that such balancing suggests that the competing interests of 
the state and of a foreign investor are “of the same order.”101 One may 
question whether this is the correct approach, or, instead, whether the 
state’s right to regulate for the public benefit should be treated as of a 
higher order than the interest of the foreign investors in the state. 
 Overall, arbitral tribunals have proved willing to give a high level 
of deference to the state’s own determination of the manner in which it 
wishes to exercise its regulatory power. For instance, the tribunal in 
S.D. Myers v. Canada famously held that  
a breach of Article 1105 [of NAFTA] occurs only when it is shown that an investor 
has been treated in such an unjust or arbitrary manner that the treatment rises 
to the level that is unacceptable from the international perspective. That 
determination must be made in the light of the high measure of deference that 
international law generally extends to the right of domestic authorities to 
regulate matters within their own borders. The determination must also take 
                                                                                                                       
 98. See, e.g., Yannaca-Small, supra note 84, at 476 (claiming that “recourse to 
another protection standard such as the violation of the fair and equitable standard, 
which represents a lower threshold, seems to gain ground”). 
 99. See, e.g., U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV., FAIR AND EQUITABLE 
TREATMENT. UNCTAD SERIES ON ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENT II 
2 (2012) (“As interpreted by arbitral tribunals, the FET standard raises highly complex 
and contentious issues as to the types of administrative and governmental action that 
can be reviewed under the standard and the degree of seriousness of breach that is 
required to activate a compensable claim.”). 
 100. See, e.g., id. at xiii (“[T]he application of FET provisions has brought to light 
the need to balance investment protection with competing policy objectives of the host 
State, and in particular, with its right to regulate in the public interest.”). 
 101. Donaldson & Kingsbury, supra note 79, at 27 (“Regardless of the intention, the 
prevalence of the references to ‘balancing’ tends to reinforce a view that the interests of 
investors on one hand and users, the state, or the public, on the other, are of the same 
order.”). 
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into account any specific rules of international law that are applicable to the 
case.102 
 More recent tribunal decisions, such as an award in Mesa Power 
v. Canada,103 followed the same approach, acknowledging a high level 
of deference to the state’s right to regulate.104 
 As part of the FET analysis, the right to regulate may also be 
discussed in the context of the legitimate expectations doctrine.105 For 
instance, the tribunal in Saluka v. Czech Republic referred to the 
state’s right to regulate as the rationale for the changes in the 
regulatory environment, which should be reasonably expected by a 
foreign investor.106 The tribunal held that 
[m]oreover, the scope of the Treaty’s protection of foreign investment against 
unfair and inequitable treatment cannot exclusively be determined by foreign 
investors’ subjective motivations and considerations. Their expectations, in order 
for them to be protected, must rise to the level of legitimacy and reasonableness 
in light of the circumstances.107 
 Finally, of particular interest to the analysis here is the fourth 
manifestation of the right to regulate: a direct reference to such right 
in exceptions, exclusions, and other safeguard provisions in investment 
                                                                                                                       
 102. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, NAFTA (UNCITRAL Rules), 
Partial Award, ¶ 263 (Nov. 13, 2000). 
 103. Mesa Power Grp., LLC v. Government of Canada, NAFTA (UNCITRAL Rules), 
PCA Case No. 2012-17, Award (Mar. 24, 2016). 
 104. Id. ¶ 493 (“[A] finding of a breach of Article 1105 [Minimum Standard of 
Treatment] ‘must be made in the light of the high measure of deference that 
international law generally extends to the right of domestic authorities to regulate 
matters within their borders’”). Note that citing S.D. Myers v. Canada, the tribunal in 
Bilcon v. Canada similarly acknowledged the high threshold of deference to the state’s 
own determination, but ultimately did not grant such deference to Canada. Clayton et 
al. v. Government of Canada, NAFTA (UNCITRAL Rules), PCA Case No. 2009-04, 
Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶ 440, 725 (Mar. 17, 2015). 
 105. See, e.g., Rudolf Dolzer, Fair and Equitable Treatment: Today’s Contours, 12 
SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 7, 27–29 (2014) (describing the link between a state’s right to 
regulate and investors’ legitimate expectations). 
 106. Saluka, supra note 91, ¶ 305 (“No investor may reasonably expect that the 
circumstances prevailing at the time the investment is made remain totally unchanged. 
In order to determine whether frustration of the foreign investor’s expectations was 
justified and reasonable, the host State’s legitimate right subsequently to regulate 
domestic matters in the public interest must be taken into consideration as well. As the 
S.D. Myers tribunal has stated, the determination of a breach of the obligation of ‘fair 
and equitable treatment’ by the host State must be made in the light of the high measure 
of deference that international law generally extends to the right of domestic authorities 
to regulate matters within their own borders.” (footnote omitted)). 
 107. Id. ¶ 304. See also Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lithuania, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/05/8, Award, ¶ 332 (Sept. 11, 2007) (“It is each State’s undeniable right 
and privilege to exercise its sovereign legislative power. A State has the right to enact, 
modify or cancel a law at its own discretion . . . . As a matter of fact, any businessman or 
investor knows that laws will evolve over time. What is prohibited however is for a State 
to act unfairly, unreasonably or inequitably in the exercise of its legislative power.”). 
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protection treaties. In these safeguard provisions, the right to regulate 
for legitimate public policy objectives may serve as an affirmative 
defense to measures otherwise in breach of the treaty provisions. The 
right to regulate may also serve as a rationale for carving out 
regulatory space from the scope of the application of a treaty. It is this 
manifestation of the right to regulate—arguably, the strongest of all—
that was used to introduce the TPP tobacco carve-out, which will be 
discussed more in depth in Section IV.C below. 
 Overall, the right to regulate remains a chameleon concept. It 
changes meaning depending on the context of the public policy 
discussions and the provision of an investment protection treaty in 
which it manifests. And it requires a case-by-case analysis by arbitral 
tribunals to distinguish instances of legitimate government regulation 
from breaches of investor protection obligations, most commonly in 
relation to expropriation and violation of the FET standard. 
 
B. Regulatory Disputes as the Challenge for ISDS 
 The term regulatory disputes is used loosely by scholars and 
commentators to describe investor–state disputes that challenge the 
government regulation by the host state as part of the substantive 
claims under IIAs. Both actions (such as introduction of a new law or 
regulation or a reduction in tax breaks108) and inactions (such as a 
failure to commence an investigation into an allegedly fraudulent 
investment scheme) may lead to regulatory disputes.109 
 As a phenomenon, regulatory disputes are not new for investor–
state arbitration. Claims alleging the discriminatory or expropriatory 
effect of government regulation with regard to foreign investments or 
investors have long been raised in investment arbitration. Early 
regulatory disputes—Maffezini110 and Methanex111—involved 
environmental regulations.112 The more recent wave of regulatory 
disputes expands beyond allegations of discrimination and 
expropriation, however, to claims of alleged violations of FET 
                                                                                                                       
 108. See, e.g., Philip Morris Asia, supra note 1, (where Philip Morris challenged in 
investment arbitration the Australian tobacco plain packaging legislation). 
 109. See, e.g., LISE JOHNSON ET AL., COLUM. CTR. ON SUSTAINABLE INV., INVESTOR-
STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, PUBLIC INTEREST AND U.S. DOMESTIC LAW 2–3 (2015) 
(providing a sample of ISDS cases that included challenges to government actions or 
inactions). 
 110. Maffezini v. The Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Award (Nov. 13, 
2000). 
 111. Methanex, supra note 91. 
 112. See Julie A. Maupin, Differentiating Among International Investment Disputes, 
in THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: BRIDGING THEORY INTO 
PRACTICE 467, 492–93 n.108 (Zachary Douglas et al. eds., 2014). 
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provisions.113 These claims involve an array of government measures, 
ranging from legislative acts seeking to reduce tobacco exposure and 
the health risks associated with smoking114 to measures providing for 
the nuclear power phase-out in order to reduce the health and 
environmental risks of nuclear power use.115 It is this public-benefits 
aspect and the regulatory scope of the challenged government 
measures that have been identified by legal scholars as distinguishing 
recent claims from the earlier generation of regulatory disputes.116 
While earlier cases involved regulation of a limited scope, addressing 
a particular industry, territory, or specific foreign investor, the latest 
regulatory investor–state arbitrations challenge measures that have a 
very remote connection or no connection at all to foreign investors. 
Most of these challenges seek damages for the alleged decrease in value 
of the investment made or expected, but may also seek specific 
performance, such as abolishing a government measure.117 
 The ability of private companies—most commonly, multinational 
corporations—to bring investor–state arbitration claims to challenge 
government measures before international tribunals has generated a 
vigorous scholarly and public policy debate and has attracted 
substantial media attention.118 Critics of ISDS are concerned that 
                                                                                                                       
 113. See, e.g., Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hung., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, 
Award, ¶ 165 (Nov. 25, 2015) (“[T]he application of the ECT’s FET standard allows for a 
balancing exercise by the host State in appropriate circumstances. The host State is not 
required to elevate unconditionally the interests of the foreign investor above all other 
considerations in every circumstance”) [hereinafter Electrabel S.A. v. Hung.]; see also 
Electrabel S.A. v. Hung., ¶ 166 (“[E]ven assuming that Electrabel had an expectation 
that it would be awarded the maximum compensation for stranded costs permitted under 
EU law, once weighed against Hungary’s legitimate right to regulate in the public 
interest, such an expectation does not appear reasonable or legitimate.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 114. See Philip Morris Asia, supra note 1; see also Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, supra 
note 1. 
 115. Vattenfall, supra note 9. 
 116. See, e.g., RESHAPING THE INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM: 
JOURNEYS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 500 (Jean E. Kalicki & Anna Joubin-Bret eds., 2015) 
(observing that “[c]ontemporary investment arbitrations frequently implicate the scope 
of the regulatory powers of the respondent States and reach well beyond the traditional 
concerns of simple expropriations and nationalizations. Instead, a much broader variety 
of regulatory and public goods disputes has come to be addressed through investment 
arbitrations, ranging from the provision of basic public services, such as water and 
sanitation, to the maintenance of public order”). 
 117. See, e.g., Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. The Commonwealth of Australia, PCA Case 
No. 2012-12, Notice of Arbitration, ¶ 8.2 (UNCITRAL Nov. 21, 2011) (seeking “an order 
for the suspension of enforcement of plain packaging legislation,” but note that Philip 
Morris later dropped its specific performance request). 
 118. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, Trade Agreements Should Not Benefit Industry 
Only, BOS. GLOBE (June 23, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2015/06/23/warren/ 
CJluXWm4B5VDTdUDsCkwEL/story.html [https://perma.cc/VV87-8XMN] (archived 
Jan. 17, 2017) (arguing that “multinational corporations don’t have to plead with the 
government to enforce their claims. Instead, modern trade deals give corporations the 
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international investment law has empowered foreign corporations to 
interfere with a state’s ability to regulate in the public interest. Some 
of them argue that foreign corporations are thus encroaching on the 
state’s sovereignty, as the right to regulate is seen by many as the core 
feature of the sovereign state.119 From the state sovereignty 
perspective, the issue of regulatory disputes appears especially 
problematic, as ISDS allows foreign corporations to interfere with the 
host government’s ability to regulate, constraining the state’s capacity 
to function for the benefit of the public.120 
 Some scholars have further argued that, through ISDS, 
corporations have not only acquired the right to directly “sue” 
sovereign states before investment tribunals, but have also received 
the right to participate in international lawmaking.121 These 
developments have made José Alvarez look into whether corporations 
have become the subjects of international law.122 
 Other scholars have expressed their concern over the institutional 
mechanism of investor–state arbitration, which places the responding 
state at the mercy of a private arbitral tribunal, often too far removed 
from the host state to properly consider public policy implications of 
                                                                                                                       
right to go straight to an arbitration panel when a country passes new laws or applies 
existing laws in ways that the corporations believe will cost them money. Known as 
investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), these international arbitration panels can 
force countries to pony up billions of dollars in compensation. And these awards stick: 
No matter how crazy or outrageous the decision, no appeals are permitted. Once the 
arbitration panel rules, taxpayers must pay”). See also “Worst Trade Deal Ever”, supra 
note 14 (noting economist’s impression that particular trade deals benefit corporations 
rather than aid the public’s interest); Provost & Kennard, supra note 73 (describing 
recent cases that illustrate international investment tribunal’s preferential treatment of 
corporations). 
 119. See Van Harten & Loughlin, supra note 13, at 147 (“Investment arbitration 
tribunals apply standards that constrain sovereign acts of a state’s legislature, judiciary 
and administration . . . . [B]y obliging states to arbitrate disputes arising from sovereign 
acts, investment treaties establish investment arbitration as a mechanism to control the 
exercise of public authority. For this reason, in particular, investment arbitration is best 
analogized to domestic administrative law.”). 
 120. See, e.g., Charles N. Brower & Lee A. Steven, Who Then Should Judge? 
Developing the International Rule of Law Under NAFTA Chapter 11, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 
193 (2001). 
 121. See, e.g., José E. Alvarez, Are Corporations “Subjects” of International Law?, 9 
SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 1, 11–12 (2011) (noting that “[in investor-state arbitration,] 
states have in effect delegated the making of international investment law to third party 
private attorneys general, namely the wealthy multinationals that can afford to bring 
the cases and generate the case law”) (footnote omitted)). See also Julian Arato, 
Corporations as Lawmakers, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 229, 231 (2015) (arguing that, with the 
help of ISDS, corporations “have developed the capacity to negotiate with states to create 
norms of international law—norms that bear a particular kind of relationship of priority 
to the state party’s domestic legal order”). 
 122. See Alvarez, supra note 121, at 12 (explaining how it can be “easy to conclude, 
based on the international investment regime, that corporations and other investors 
under BITs and FTAs are international legal persons or subjects of international law” 
(footnote omitted)). 
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the state’s government measures.123 Along these lines, William Burke-
White and Andreas von Staden have argued that  
[t]he inherent problem with ICSID tribunals . . . is that they are not well 
positioned or equipped to engage in lawmaking, to internalize the context, and 
to weigh the policy considerations at play in a particular case. . . . ICSID 
arbitrators are far removed from the polities over whom they exercise control.124 
 Some have criticized international investment law for allowing 
extensive treaty and forum shopping, which add to the social cost of 
international dispute resolution and often lead to unfair results in 
ISDS. In particular, MFN provisions and various loopholes in investor 
protection treaties allow a foreign corporation to reorganize and 
establish in a jurisdiction with a more beneficial investor protection 
regime.125 Furthermore, in addition to ISDS, a multinational 
corporation and its shareholders may challenge the same government 
measure in other forums, such as domestic courts and—with the 
assistance of other governments—through the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) dispute settlement mechanism.126 This may lead 
to overlapping and related claims—taking two bites of the same apple, 
as the saying goes—with conflicting results by various dispute 
resolution bodies, double recovery, and enormous costs for a defending 
state.127 
 Furthermore, commentators are particularly concerned that 
investor–state arbitrations that challenge government measures may 
lead to a “regulatory chill,” which is broadly defined as less-than-
optimal regulation that would be introduced by the governments 
because of fear of investor–state claims by foreign investors.128 To date, 
there are no data demonstrating that governments across the world 
indeed react to ongoing or completed investor–state arbitrations by 
refusing to regulate where they think their measures may be 
challenged in ISDS. Yet, the proponents of investor–state arbitration 
                                                                                                                       
 123. See, e.g., Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 74, at 336. 
 124. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 125. See, e.g., Philip Morris Asia, supra note 1, ¶ 584 (explaining that Philip Morris 
restructured its operation to make use of the BIT between Australia and Hong Kong: 
“[f]rom all the evidence on file, the Tribunal can only conclude that the main and 
determinative, if not sole, reason for the restructuring was the intention to bring a claim 
under the Treaty, using an entity from Hong Kong”). 
 126. Take, for instance, the Philip Morris’ dispute with Australia, where the 
claimant sought to challenge the Australian tobacco plain packaging legislation in three 
different fora—domestic courts in Australia, an investor–state arbitration pursuant to 
the Australia-Hong Kong BIT, and at the WTO. See Philip Morris Asia, supra note 1.  
 127. See David Gaukrodger, Investment Treaties and Shareholder Claims: Analysis 
of Treaty Practice 10 (OECD Working Papers on International Investment, Paper 
No. 2014/03, 2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jxvk6shpvs4-en [https://perma.cc/C6CT-
SPZV] (archived Feb. 2. 2017). 
 128. See, e.g., Tienhaara, supra note 16. See also Côté, supra note 16. 
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continue to present arguments to rebut the unsupported allegations 
that ISDS may have a chilling effect on the right to regulate.129 
IV. RESPONDING TO ISDS CHALLENGES 
A. Procedural and Structural Initiatives 
 Responding to the most pressing challenges of ISDS, the 
international community has already proposed and brought to life 
various measures seeking to improve the ISDS regime. To address the 
lack of transparency, states and other stakeholders have developed and 
made available for use the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency130 and 
the Mauritius Convention on Transparency131. State parties also 
increasingly incorporate transparency provisions into their BITs and 
into the investment chapters of their FTAs.132 These provisions seek to 
make the ISDS process more open and accessible to the public through 
various disclosure obligations and publication requirements.133 They 
also allow non-disputing parties and civil society groups to get involved 
and express their opinion on a dispute by making third-party 
submissions.134 There are also revived efforts to increase the 
                                                                                                                       
 129. See, e.g., Nikos Lavranos, After Philipp Morris II: The “Regulatory Chill” Argument 
Failed – Yet Again, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Aug. 18, 2016), http://kluwerarbitrationblog 
.com/2016/08/18/after-philipp-morris-ii-the-regulatory-chill-argument-failed-yet-again/ 
[https://perma.cc/C4LT-CT97] (archived Feb. 2, 2017). 
 130. UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 19, art. 5(1) (discussing that 
unless otherwise agreed by the treaty or disputing parties, the rules apply to investor–
state arbitrations initiated under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules to resolve disputes 
arising out of IIAs concluded on or after April 1, 2014. The Rules provide for various 
disclosure obligations—most importantly, publication requirement—which make treaty-
based investor–state arbitrations more transparent and accessible for the public). 
 131. Mauritius Convention on Transparency, supra note 21. This Convention, 
which is yet to enter into force, allows state parties to express their willingness to obey 
by the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency with respect to investor–state arbitrations 
initiated pursuant to IIAs concluded prior to April 1, 2014. 
 132. See, e.g., ChAFTA, supra note 22, art. 9.17 (addressing transparency of arbitral 
proceedings). See also EUSFTA, supra note 24, art. 9.22 and annex 9-G. 
 133. See UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 19, arts. 2–3, 6 (providing 
for a number of transparency-related obligations, such as an obligation to provide 
information on the investor–state arbitration to the designated repository to publish 
such information at the commencement of arbitral proceedings, to publish and make 
available to the public documents on investor–state arbitration, and to make hearings 
accessible to the public). 
 134. See id. arts. 4–5. Note that transparency is crucial to allow non-disputing 
parties and civil society groups to prepare third parties submissions. Submissions from 
non-disputing state parties are particularly relevant in this respect as they allow 
acquiring information on the content and meaning of the treaty text from the other state-
party to the BIT (or, in case of multilateral treaty, other state-parties to the treaty). 
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accountability of arbitrators by introducing codes of conduct and ethics 
rules into investment treaties.135 
 Beyond these efforts, some countries seek to bring structural 
changes to the ISDS regime. The most far-reaching proposal in this 
respect has been put forward by the European Union, which, since the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, has competence on foreign direct 
investment.136 As a result, the European Commission now negotiates 
comprehensive trade and investment treaties on behalf of the EU 
Member States, as opposed to the prior practice of individual Member 
States entering into BITs on their own.137 In the context of the TTIP 
negotiations with the United States, the Commission proposed to 
replace ISDS with a system of permanent international investment 
courts that would function similarly to WTO dispute resolution.138 The 
European Union139 has already implemented its new approach to 
                                                                                                                       
 135. See ChAFTA, supra note 22, ch. 9, annex 9-A (containing a code of conduct for 
arbitrators appointed pursuant to the investment chapter of ChAFTA); see also 
EUSFTA, supra note 24, annex 9-F. 
 136. Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
establishing the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1 [hereinafter 
Lisbon Treaty]; see also Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union art. 207, 2008 O.J. C 115/47, 140. (discussing investment-related 
provisions: “[t]he common commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles, 
particularly with regard to changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade 
agreements relating to trade in goods and services, and the commercial aspects of 
intellectual property, foreign direct investment, the achievement of uniformity in 
measures of liberalisation, export policy and measures to protect trade such as those to 
be taken in the event of dumping or subsidies.” (emphasis added)) [hereinafter TFEU]. 
 137. The European Union is currently negotiating a number of IIAs on behalf of the 
European Union and its Member States. This differs from the pre-Lisbon Treaty practice, 
when individual Member States negotiated and entered into BITs on their own behalf. 
For older BITs, the future of the treaty may be unclear, especially in cases where both 
parties to a treaty are now the EU Member States (intra-EU BITs). Some of these 
treaties will be terminated and concluded on behalf of the European Union. For intra-
EU BITs, the European Commission has requested its Member States to terminate the 
intra-EU BITs. The request has not always been welcomed by the Member States, as 
often the treaty provisions are broader than the exclusive competence of the European 
Union, which only covers foreign direct investments (FDIs). And so, there is certain 
resistance among the EU Member States to terminate their intra-EU BITs, which now 
has motivated the European Commission to initiate infringement proceedings against 
states failing to so do (such as Austria, the Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, and 
Sweden). See Press Release, European Commission, Commission Asks Member States 
to Terminate Their Intra-EU Bilateral Investment Treaties (Brussels, June 18, 2015), 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5198_en.htm [https://perma.cc/ZPB4-UWF3] 
(archived Feb. 11, 2017). 
 138. See Press Release European Commission, Commission Proposes New 
Investment Court System for TTIP and Other EU Trade and Investment Negotiations 
(Brussels, Sept. 16, 2015), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5651_en.htm 
[https://perma.cc/7Y5N-3VA3] (archived Mar. 6, 2017). 
 139. INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, ADDITIONAL FACILITY RULES 
(effective April 10, 2006), https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/icsiddocs/AFR_ 
English-final.pdf. [https://perma.cc/34SJ-TKY3] (archived Feb. 2, 2017).  
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investment dispute resolution in its recent FTAs with Vietnam140 and 
Canada,141 where it introduced a two-tier investment tribunal system 
instead of traditional ISDS. 
 Both FTAs provide for a permanent tribunal and appellate 
tribunal to be composed of professional members appointed for a 
limited term, which can be renewed only once.142 The treaties set 
qualification and experience requirements for these members, 
establishing that they “shall possess the qualifications required in 
their respective countries for appointment to judicial office, or be 
jurists of recognised competence,” “shall have demonstrated expertise 
in public international law,” and preferably “shall have expertise in 
particular, in international investment law, in international trade law 
and the resolution of disputes arising under international investment 
or international trade agreements.”143 Yet, under both FTAs, the new 
mechanism of investment dispute resolution will continue to rely on 
the commonly used investor–state arbitration rules—the ICSID 
Convention, the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, and the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules.144 If the legitimacy shortcomings of ISDS are in fact 
best addressed by replacing private arbitrators with professional 
judges, similar provisions in other IIAs concluded by the European 
Union may follow. However, it may require some time and a strong 
political will because many of today’s thirty-three hundred IIAs 
provide for traditional ISDS. 
 Outside of the European Union and the ongoing TTIP discussions, 
three countries (Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia) have chosen to limit 
their procedural exposure to investor–state arbitration by leaving the 
ICSID Convention.145 Another trend in international investment law 
has been a cancellation by countries of their BITs146 and multilateral 
IIAs.147 By doing so, they seek not only to revoke their promise to 
arbitrate (most commonly, under the ICSID Convention or the 
                                                                                                                       
 140. EU-Vietnam FTA, supra note 23. 
 141. CETA, supra note 27, art. 8.27–8.28. 
 142. Id.; EU-Vietnam FTA, supra note 23, § 3, arts. 12–13. 
 143. CETA, supra note 27, art. 8.27(4); EU-Vietnam FTA, supra note 23, § 3, 
art. 12(4). 
 144. CETA, supra note 27, art. 8.23(2); EU-Vietnam FTA, supra note 23, § 3, art. 7. 
 145. ICSID Convention, supra note 18. 
 146. Notable examples include South Africa and Indonesia, which have been 
actively terminating their BITs. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. See also 
International Investment Agreements Navigator, U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV. 
(Jan. 31, 2017), http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA [https://perma.cc/7EC8-
7RZU] (archived Feb. 1, 2017) (tracking information on the status of IIAs, including 
BITs, by economy and country grouping). 
 147. Gaetano Iorio Fiorelli, Italy Withdraws from Energy Charter Treaty, BAKER 
MCKENZIE: GLOBAL ARB. NEWS (May 6, 2015), https://globalarbitrationnews.com/italy-
withdraws-from-energy-charter-treaty-20150507/ [https://perma.cc/S8U9-HTR9] (archived 
Feb. 2, 2017) (discussing the Italian government’s withdrawal from the ECT). 
2017] THE RIGHT TO REGULATE IN INVESTOR–STATE ARBITRATION 387 
 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules148), but also to eliminate their 
obligations with respect to substantive investor protection obligations, 
a violation of which can result in arbitration. 
 The overall goal of these measures is to address the procedural 
and structural deficiencies of ISDS. Procedurally, they seek to put the 
public on notice about an investor–state arbitration, to grant the public 
access to arbitration materials and the award, and to allow 
submissions by third parties and non-disputing parties to the treaty. 
Structurally, they seek to replace private arbitrators with professional 
judges who possess a sufficient level of expertise and experience, who 
are financially independent, and who can be held accountable for the 
timeliness, consistency, and quality of the legal decisions they make. 
Going forward, governments may respond to the European 
Commission’s call to replace the current ISDS regime with the 
permanent international investment court system proposed by the 
European Commission. 
B. Safeguards to Preserve the Right to Regulate 
 The above initiatives do not directly address the major challenge 
for ISDS today: regulatory disputes and their potential to produce a 
chilling effect on the state’s power to regulate. Instead, in an attempt 
to tackle the threat of regulatory disputes, sovereign states have 
turned to more careful treaty drafting. In doing so, they gradually 
replace the first generation of investor protection treaties—usually 
concise agreements offering broad investor protection obligations—
with modern comprehensive BITs and other IIAs.149 These modern 
treaties tend to limit the scope and the types of substantive investor 
protection obligations and, consequently, the scope of claims a foreign 
investor can submit in arbitration.150 
 Another trend in today’s treaty making is the inclusion into IIAs 
of provisions that reserve for the state the right to regulate—the 
safeguard151 provisions. Most commonly, they recognize the state’s 
                                                                                                                       
 148. UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 20, art. 1(3). 
 149. Compare, e.g., Investment Policy Hub: 1994 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment 
Treaty, UNITED NATIONS UNCTAD (Jan. 22, 2017), http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ 
Download/TreatyFile/2867 [https://perma.cc/2PRR-TX36] (archived Feb. 2, 2017) 
(sixteen articles and an annex), with 2012 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 12 (thirty-seven 
articles and three annexes, reflecting more careful and elaborate treaty-drafting). 
 150. See, e.g., ChAFTA, supra note 22, ch. 9 (providing foreign investors with 
national treatment (Article 9.3) and most-favored-nation treatment (Article 9.4), but not 
other common guarantees—such as minimum standard of treatment and non-
expropriation—thereby limiting potential exposure to ISDS under the treaty. 
Article 9.12.2 of ChAFTA then further narrows such exposure by providing consent to 
ISDS only with respect to claims alleging breach of Article 9.3). 
 151. See Robert Stumberg, Safeguards for Tobacco Control: Options for the TPPA, 
39 AM. J.L. & MED. 382, 399 (2013) (applying the term safeguard to both exceptions and 
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right to adopt measures necessary for the protection of public health, 
the environment, or other policy objectives.152 Safeguard provisions 
can be found in the body of a treaty, its preamble, annexes, or even its 
reservations, declarations, and understandings. In the body of the text, 
a reference to the right to regulate can be placed in a separate article 
or incorporated into an article on an individual investor protection, 
such as non-expropriation153 or performance requirements.154 The U.S. 
Model BIT adds to this practice by also stipulating the state’s right to 
adopt measures “appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its 
territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental 
concerns.”155 Thus, by contrast to most IIAs, the U.S. Model BIT 
incorporates the right to regulate on particular subject matter—
environmental protection. This is in addition to other safeguards 
already contained in the U.S. Model BIT, such as provisions on 
performance requirements, non-conforming measures, essential 
security, taxation, and expropriation.156 
 The scope and form of safeguard provisions differ substantially 
across investor protection treaties. The scope of the application of 
exceptions and exclusions may cover the whole treaty, a particular 
chapter, or an individual investor protection obligation. Depending on 
the scope, it may exclude application of the treaty provisions to a 
measure, sector, or an industry. There is no consistency in the practice 
of individual states with regard to the use and application of safeguard 
                                                                                                                       
exclusions—discussed further in this Article—with respect to tobacco control measures 
and explaining the options for such safeguards for the TPP). 
 152. See EU-Vietnam FTA, supra note 23, § 2 (discussing the fact that one of the 
recent examples of this practice is Article 13 bis(1): “[t]he Parties reaffirm the right to 
regulate within their territories to achieve legitimate policy objectives, such as the 
protection of public health, safety, environment or public morals, social or consumer 
protection or promotion and protection of cultural diversity”). 
 153. See, e.g., id. § 2, (proving in para. 3 that:“[f]or greater certainty, except in the 
rare circumstances where the impact of a measure or series of measures is so severe in 
light of its purpose that it appears manifestly excessive, non-discriminatory measures or 
series of measures by a Party that are designed to protect legitimate public policy 
objectives do not constitute indirect expropriation”); see also 2012 U.S. Model BIT, supra 
note 12, annex B (“Except in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory actions 
by a Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, 
such as public health, safety, and the environment, do not constitute indirect 
expropriations.”). 
 154. See, e.g., 2012 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 12, art. 8(3)(c) (in particular, 
reserving for the state the right to adopt and maintain “measures, including 
environmental measures . . . [ that are] necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life 
or health [and measures that are] related to the conservation of living or non-living 
exhaustible natural resources”). 
 155. See, e.g., id. art. 12(3) (recognizing each Party’s right to “exercise discretion 
with respect to regulatory, compliance, investigatory, and prosecutorial matters, and to 
make decisions regarding the allocation of resources to enforcement with respect to other 
environmental matters determined to have higher priorities”). 
 156. Id. arts. 8(3)(c), 14, 18, 21, and Annex B. 
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provisions, but all safeguards are alike in that they seek to reserve for 
the state some regulatory space by (1) allowing enumerated policy 
objectives to serve as an affirmative defense for a measure otherwise 
in breach of the treaty and/or by (2) excluding application of the 
investment protection treaty to certain subject matter. 
1. Exceptions 
 Provisions of IIAs that most commonly protect the state’s power 
to regulate are known as exceptions157 in international investment law. 
Generally speaking, exceptions are safeguard provisions that reserve 
for the state the right to adopt and enforce measures necessary for the 
protection of legitimate public welfare objectives, such as human life, 
health, the environment, or public morals.158 Some scholars have 
argued that exceptions are distinct from other safeguard provisions in 
that they serve as an affirmative defense for regulatory measures 
falling within the scope of the exception.159 Consequently, if 
successfully invoked, exceptions eliminate the state’s liability and 
damages for such measures, which are otherwise in breach of the 
treaty obligations.160 This is a narrow understanding of exceptions and 
                                                                                                                       
 157. The variety of terms used with respect to safeguard provisions is astounding 
and includes such terms as exceptions, exclusions, exemptions, derogations, 
reservations, non-conforming measures (NCM), non-precluded measures (NPM). Among 
these terms, the terms exceptions, NCM and NPM are used in the treaties, while most 
other terms are employed only in scholarly and public policy debates. 
 158. See WTO Analytical Index: Vol. 1, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, art. XX 845 
(2nd ed. 2007), https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/gatt1994_07_e 
.htm [https://perma.cc/S5UZ-QRLB] (archived Jan. 31, 2017) (“Paragraphs (a) to (j) 
comprise measures that are recognized as exceptions to substantive obligations 
established in the GATT 1994, because the domestic policies embodied in such measures 
have been recognized as important and legitimate in character.” (quoting the Appellate 
Body in US-Shrimp, Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of 
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶ 121, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) 
[https://perma.cc/SP2U-D3JT] (archived Jan. 31, 2017)). 
 159. See Stumberg, supra note 151, at 402–03 (“In the dispute settlement process, 
the purpose of an exception is to enable a country to present an affirmative defense of a 
measure that would otherwise violate a trade or investment rule. From a health 
perspective, the opportunity to defend protects the public interest. From a trade 
perspective, the opportunity to “weigh and balance” a health measure protects trade-
promotion objectives from all but the most efficiently designed heath measures.”). 
 160. William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Investment Protection in 
Extraordinary Times: The Interpretation and Application of Non-Precluded Measures 
Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 307, 332–35. See also Josef 
Ostřanský, How Can States Use Exceptions in Treaties to Defend Tobacco Control 
Legislation?, 9 TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 1, 3 (2012) (disagreeing with the interpretation 
of the function and operation of exceptions, arguing that exceptions effectively remove 
the measure from the application of a treaty: “[t]he result of successfully invoking an 
exceptions clause is that the treaty does not apply to the particular conduct in question. 
In other words, once the conduct falls within the exception, investment protection does 
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is the understanding adopted in this Article. Other scholars, however, 
use the word exception in its broad sense, applying it to any deviation 
from the investor protection regime, including instances where a 
measure is excluded from the application of a treaty.161 
 A typical exception can be found in Article XVII(3) of the BIT 
between Canada and Romania, which provides that, 
[s]ubject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner that 
would constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between investments 
or between investors, or a disguised restriction on international trade or 
investment, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent a 
Contracting Party from adopting or enforcing measures necessary: 
(a) to ensure compliance with laws and regulations that are not inconsistent with 
the provisions of this Agreement; 
(b) to protect human, animal or plant life or health; or 
(c) for the conservation of living or non-living exhaustible natural resources.162 
 In addition, modern IIAs often contain a separate article on 
general exceptions, which can be found both in BITs and FTAs (in the 
latter case, either as part of the investment chapter or a separate 
chapter, usually applicable only to the selected chapters of an FTA).163 
Some IIAs incorporate by reference the articles on general exceptions 
                                                                                                                       
not apply to such conduct. The host state cannot be held liable as there is no breach of 
an international obligation.”). 
 161. See, e.g., ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUÍS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF 
INVESTMENT TREATIES: STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 481 (2009) (“[General] exceptions are 
used to exclude particular sectors or subject matters from IIA obligations or to permit 
measures necessary to meet specific objectives, including protecting essential security 
interests, public order, human health and the environment.” (emphases added)). 
 162. Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of 
Romania for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Can.-Rom. 
art. XVII, Aug. 5, 2009, http://www.treaty-accord.gc.ca/text-texte.aspx?id=105170 
[https://perma.cc/7TVU-D9Z4] (archived Jan. 31, 2017). 
 163. See, e.g., TPP, supra note 3, art. 29.1 (the article is a part of Chapter 29 titled 
“Exceptions and General Provisions”); ChAFTA, supra note 22, art. 9.8 (this article titled 
“General Exceptions” is included directly into the investment chapter of the treaty, and 
not into a separate chapter of the FTA applicable to the treaty as a whole); see also 
Agreement Between Japan and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay for the Liberalization, 
Promotion and Protection of Investment, Japan-Uru., art. 22, Jan. 26, 2015; Canada-
China BIT art. 33, Sept. 9, 2012; Agreement between the Government of the Republic of 
Macedonia and the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the Reciprocal 
Promotion and Protection of Investments, Maced.-Kaz., art. 13, July 2, 2012 [hereinafter 
Macedonia-Kazakhstan BIT]; Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of 
Turkey and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan Concerning the 
Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Pak.-Turk., art. 5, May 22, 2012 
[hereinafter Pakistan-Turkey BIT]. 
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contained in Article XX164 and Article XIV165 of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS), respectively. These two articles allow Member States 
to adopt and enforce measures necessary to protect or secure important 
public policy objectives, including the protection of public morals and 
human or animal health and maintenance of public order. In doing so, 
Member States are allowed to “act inconsistently with obligations set 
out in other provisions of the respective agreements, provided that all 
of the conditions set out therein are satisfied.”166 To date, the WTO has 
developed a comprehensive body of law interpreting the scope, degree 
of deference, and other elements of general exceptions.167 
 Exceptions may be difficult for a state to successfully invoke in 
ISDS, largely because of the need to satisfy the nexus requirement—
that is, to prove that a measure is necessary to achieve a public policy 
objective.168 Arbitral tribunals have used various criteria to assess a 
challenged regulatory measure in view of the state’s investor 
protection obligations. Borrowing from international customary law, 
                                                                                                                       
 164. WTO Analytical Index: Vol. 1, supra note 158, art. XX (providing, in particular, 
that: “[s]ubject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which 
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries 
where the same condition prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, 
nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by 
any contracting party of measures . . . (b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant 
life or health”). 
 165. General Agreement on Trade in Services, art. XIV, Apr. 15, 1994, 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/gats_02_e.htm#article14 
[https://perma.cc/E5DW-8QAR] (archived Feb. 2, 2017); see also Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, annex 1B, 284 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 
33 I.L.M. 1167, https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/26-gats.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
L656-XT3W] (archived Jan. 31, 2017) (providing, in particular, that: “[s]ubject to the 
requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a 
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where like 
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on trade in services, nothing in this 
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any Member of 
measures: (a) necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public order; 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health”). 
 166. WTO Analytical Index: General Agreement on Trade in Services, WORLD 
TRADE ORGANIZATION, art. XIV, ¶ 74, https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_ 
index_e/gats_02_e.htm#article14 [https://perma.cc/X2FC-V93W] (archived Jan. 31, 2017). 
 167. See WTO Analytical Index: Vol. 1, supra note 158, ¶¶ 844–955 (interpreting 
and applying general exceptions under Article XX of the GATT in the WTO 
jurisprudence); WTO Analytical Index: General Agreement on Trade in Services, supra 
note 166, ¶¶ 74–92 (interpreting and applying general exceptions under Article XIV of 
the GATS). See also Stumberg, supra note 151, at 404 (distinguishing six elements of a 
hypothetical exception, including its scope, protection, deference, nexus, objective and 
additional restriction, and suggesting that “exceptions have at least four elements and 
as many as six; exclusions usually have three”). 
 168. See Stumberg, supra note 151, at 405 (explaining that the WTO health 
exception does little to prevent litigation because of its complexity, which requires for 
stages of analysis, and the “vagueness of text,” which gives dispute panels broad 
discretion to interpret terms like “necessity” (footnote omitted)). 
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tribunals sometimes analyze the measure using the stringent “but for” 
requirement.169 In other instances they apply a balancing test or 
proportionality analysis.170 In any case, such analyses always reflect 
the tribunal’s own perception as to what measure is necessary for the 
achievement of the public policy goal.171 
 Additionally, general exceptions provide for different permissible 
objectives, ranging from public health and morality to environmental 
protection. Legal scholars have suggested that exceptions with 
different objectives may require a different degree of deference to the 
state’s own determination as to what measures are necessary to 
achieve a regulatory objective.172 They further argue that arbitral 
tribunals may be willing to allow a state to use the self-judging 
exception173 to determine what makes a measure “necessary” for some 
regulatory objectives but not others.174 For instance, tribunals might 
recognize that a defending state knows better what constitutes its 
public morals and what measures are necessary to protect them.175 By 
contrast, tribunals might be less willing to defer to the state’s own 
determination as to what constitutes a threat to public health.176 
There, the claim is more easily verifiable for a tribunal, for instance, 
by relying on scientific evidence.177 Consequently, invoking a general 
exception with a clear legitimate objective may be a highly 
unpredictable defense.178 
 Finally, exceptions should not be confused with other declarations 
that can be made by a state with respect to a treaty, such as 
                                                                                                                       
 169. See NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 161, at 486–87 (discussing the 
Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization’s interpretation of the GATT). 
 170. See Stumberg, supra note 151, at 405. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 160, at 332–36, 369 (arguing that 
because some deference to the state’s own determination is implied in treaties, “it is 
appropriate, both as a matter of treaty interpretation and judicial policy, to read NPM 
clauses as incorporating a ‘margin of appreciation’ that grants states some latitude to 
make initial determinations as to whether their actions are covered by an NPM clause. 
The function of a tribunal, then, ought to be the determination of the permissible and 
legitimate boundaries of the margin of appreciation that arises from the terms of an 
NPM clause.”). 
 173. See, e.g., Stumberg, supra note 151, at 413–14 (discussing the self-judging 
exception).  
 174. Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 160, at 332–36. 
 175. Id. at 364. 
 176. Id. at 361. 
 177. Id. at 361 (“What distinguishes public health from most of the other 
permissible objectives is that the existence of threats is far more susceptible to objective 
scientific proof than, for example, the more subjective threats to a nation’s security.”). 
 178. See Stumberg, supra note 151, at 403 (“The vagueness of [exceptions’] terms 
(like “measures necessary” to protect health) requires interpretation, and the factual 
context will change with every measures that a country or investor decides to 
challenge.”). 
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clarifications, understandings, and reservations.179 In contrast to these 
declarations, which are largely unilateral statements, exceptions are 
mutually agreed upon by the treaty parties. As a result, exceptions 
change the investor protection regime for all the parties to a treaty, 
while declarations do so only for the state that makes a declaration. 
Exceptions are also distinct from defenses under customary 
international law, such as necessity, force majeure, distress, and 
consent.180 Most importantly, in contrast to such customary law 
defenses, exceptions are based on treaty law. They serve as an 
affirmative defense for regulatory measures otherwise in breach of 
international investment law, performing the function of lex specialis 
to other defenses under international law.181 
 A separate type of general exception is a security exception182 such 
as the national security exception under Article 2102 of NAFTA183 or 
the security exceptions under Article 29.2 of the TPP.184 Security 
exceptions have specific objectives, typically the “maintenance or 
restoration of international peace and security, or protection of [the 
host state’s] own essential security interests.”185 A survey of essential 
security exceptions in BITs and FTAs revealed that most of such 
                                                                                                                       
 179. Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties art. 2(d), May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 (noting that reservation “means a unilateral statement, however phrased 
or named, made by a State, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to 
a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions 
of the treaty in their application to that State”) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
 180. See, e.g., NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 161, at 480 (noting that “state 
responsibility for breaches of IIA obligations may be precluded under customary 
international law on a number of bases, including consent, force majeure and necessity,” 
as well as other defenses, such as acquiescence and estoppel). 
 181. See, e.g., Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 160, at 321 (explaining that 
“customary defenses provide an excuse for breaching a treaty that may absolve a state 
of international legal responsibility after the fact. In contrast, NPM clauses remove 
certain types of state actions from the substantive protections of a particular treaty 
instrument”; and further distinguishing NPM and customary defenses in terms of “their 
theoretical justification, their source of legal authority, and their scope of applicability.”). 
 182. See generally Katia Yannaca-Small, Essential Security Interests under 
International Investment Law, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT PERSPECTIVES: FREEDOM 
OF INVESTMENT IN A CHANGING WORLD 93–134 (2007) (providing a review of the security 
exceptions across various investor protection treaties, provisions of customary 
international law, interpretations by arbitral tribunals in investor–state disputes, and 
containing a table of BITs and FTAs with investment chapters, which include provisions 
on essential security interests). 
 183. NAFTA, supra note 39, art. 2102. 
 184. See TPP, supra note 3, art. 29.2 (providing “[n]othing in this Agreement shall 
be construed to: (a) require a Party to furnish or allow access to any information the 
disclosure of which it determines to be contrary to its essential security interests; or 
(b) preclude a Party from applying measures that it considers necessary for the 
fulfilment of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of 
international peace or security, or the protection of its own essential security interests”); 
see also Agreement on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Egypt-
Switz., art. 10, June 7, 2010 (outlining security exceptions). 
 185. Id. art. 29.2. 
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exceptions “are limited in their scope to circumstances related to 
periods of war, traffic of arms or other emergency.”186 Reliance on the 
specific security exception is usually accepted for a shorter period of 
time, limited by the goal of the exception, such as until international 
peace or security is restored. The distinction between the general and 
specific exceptions does not always make sense, as some treaties 
include maintenance of international peace and security and/or 
protection of essential security interests in a single article on general 
exceptions.187 
2. Exclusions 
 Another group of safeguard provisions is exclusions. In legal 
scholarship and tribunal awards, exclusions are sometimes considered 
to be a type of exception.188 But other scholars distinguish exclusions 
from exceptions, employing the term exclusions solely with respect to 
provisions that exclude application of a treaty (its chapters, or 
individual provisions) from a certain measure all together.189 
Consequently, as these scholars explain, with respect to covered 
measures, exclusions “deny jurisdiction for dispute settlement and 
hence . . . preclude liability for trade sanctions or compensation to 
investors.”190 By contrast, exceptions apply to measures covered by the 
treaty, but serve as an affirmative defense once the violation of a treaty 
is established.191 
 A common example of an exclusion is a tax carve-out—a provision 
removing tax measures from the application of a BIT.192 The most 
recent example of an exclusion—and a very troublesome one in my 
                                                                                                                       
 186. Yannaca-Small, supra note 182, at 94; see also ECT, supra note 42, art. 24. 
 187. See, e. g., Macedonia-Kazakhstan BIT, supra note 163, art. 13 (“General 
exceptions[:] Nothing in this Agreement shall be interpreted as interfering to commit by 
the Parties of the actions necessary for protection of national security or measures 
necessary for maintenance of a public order, or measures in line with their obligations 
under the United Nations Charter for maintenance of international peace and security, 
provided that application of such measures would not mean unconditioned or 
unreasonable discrimination by the Party, or the latent restriction of investments.”); see 
also Pakistan-Turkey BIT, supra note 163, art. 5 (including security interests within 
general exceptions). 
 188. See Stumberg, supra note 151, at 401. 
 189. Id. at 401–02. 
 190. Id. at 402. 
 191. Id. 
 192. See, e.g., 2012 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 12, art. 21 (establishing a carve-out 
for taxation measures, except as provided by the treaty itself, for instance, under Article 
6 (Expropriation), which is applicable to taxation measures); see also TPP, supra note 3, 
art. 29.4; Free Trade Agreement, S. Kor.-U.S., art. 23.3, June 30, 2007 (entered into force 
Mar. 15, 2012), https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta/final-
text [https://perma.cc/7GSP-LRRK] (archived Feb. 2, 2017) (“Except as set out in this 
Article, nothing in this Agreement shall apply to taxation measures.”). 
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view—is the option for the subject-matter jurisdictional carve-out with 
respect to tobacco control measures in the TPP.193 
 The distinction between exceptions and exclusions is not always 
easy to draw. The text of the treaty and its interpretation are crucial 
to identifying the type of safeguard to which a particular provision 
belongs. Generally, exceptions contain wording as follows: “nothing in 
this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or 
enforcement by any contracting party of measures . . . necessary to 
protect human, animal or plant life or health.”194 Exclusions often use 
words such as the following: “nothing in this Agreement shall apply 
to . . .” or a similar statement of excluding nature.195 
 Legal scholars have identified two types of exclusions: partial and 
full exclusions.196 Partial exclusions exclude application of a chapter or 
an article of the treaty “to a particular product, a subject (e.g., tobacco 
control), a sector, or more broadly, to a particular country.”197 Full 
exclusions carve out certain measures or a subject of regulation from 
the application of a treaty as a whole.198 Along these lines, the term 
carve-out—which is more common in scholarly and policy papers than 
in treaties—is used as a synonym for full exclusion with regard to 
broad provisions that exclude application of a treaty to a sector, 
industry, or activity.199 Yet there is no uniformity in the application of 
these terms. Scholars and commentators may use the term carve-out 
even where an exclusion removes a measure from the application of a 
separate chapter only.200 
3. Non-Precluded Measures 
 Other investor protection treaties provide for safeguards by 
enumerating measures with respect to which a treaty will not apply.201 
In international investment law, such measures are known as non-
precluded measures (NPMs)202 or non-conforming measures 
                                                                                                                       
 193. TPP, supra note 3, art. 29.5. 
 194. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 
U.N.T.S. 194, art. XX. 
 195. See, e.g., Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Austl., art. 22.3, May 18, 2004, 43 I.L.M 
1248 (stating that “[e[xcept as set out in this Article, nothing in this Agreement shall 
apply to taxation measures”). 
 196. See Stumberg, supra note 151, at 401–02. 
 197. Id. at 401. 
 198. Id. at 402. 
 199. Id. 
 200. See Puig & Shaffer, supra note 30 (referring to the TPP’s tobacco safeguard 
provision under Article 29.5 as a “carve-out,” while the article allows a state party to 
deny the benefits of only Section B of the TPP’s investment chapter, and not of the TPP 
as a whole). 
 201. See e.g., TPP, supra note 3, ch. 9, art. 9.12.1. 
 202. See, e.g., Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investment art. 14.1, Bahr.-U.S., Sept. 29, 1999, S. TREATY DOC. No. 106-25 (“This 
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(NCMs).203 Modern IIAs often contain annexes with schedules of all 
existing NPMs and provide for continuation, renewal, or amendment 
of such measures. State parties may also agree that a treaty will not 
apply to any future measure adopted or maintained by the state party 
in a particular industry, sector, or activity.204 Consequently, as Burke-
White and von Staden explain, NPMs perform a “risk-allocation 
function” by “transferring the costs of harming an investment from 
host states to investors in exceptional circumstances.”205 
 Exceptions and NPMs perform essentially the same function: they 
provide the state with the regulatory space for domestic 
policymaking.206 A state may prefer exceptions because they allow a 
state to keep its regulatory options open, adopting any measure it sees 
fit in order to achieve a particular regulatory objective. Exceptions, 
however, require a case-by-case assessment with regard to whether a 
measure falls within the scope of a legitimate regulatory objective. 
Treaty provisions do not provide much guidance in this respect, and so 
arbitral tribunals often have to decide what standard to apply and how 
much deference to give to the state’s own determination.207 By 
contrast, NPMs are listed up front by the state party to an investor 
protection treaty. Consequently, NPM provisions are more limiting on 
the state’s regulatory power, but they provide more certainty to the 
investor protection regime by putting a foreign investor on notice with 
regard to any non-conforming measures. NPMs are often used in BITs 
                                                                                                                       
Treaty shall not preclude a Party from applying measures which it considers necessary 
for the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of 
international peace or security, or the protection of its own essential security interests.” 
(emphasis added)); Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investment art. IX, Ukr.-U.S., Mar. 4, 1994, S. TREATY DOC. No. 103-37 (“This Treaty 
shall not preclude the application by either Party of measures necessary for the 
maintenance of public order, the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the 
maintenance or restoration of international peace or security, or the protection of its own 
essential security interests.” (emphasis added)). 
 203. See TPP, supra note 3, ch. 9, art. 9.12.1 (providing for an exclusion from 
national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment for any existing non-conforming 
measure—as specified for each state party in its Schedule to Annex I to the TPP—as well 
as the continuation, renewal, and certain amendments to such measure); see also id. ch. 
9, art. 9.12.2 (providing for an exclusion for “any measure that a Party adopts or 
maintains with respect to sectors, subsectors or activities” as specified for the respective 
state party in its Schedule to Annex II of the TPP). 
 204. E.g., TPP, supra note 3, ch. 9, art. 9.12.2. 
 205. Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 160, at 314. 
 206. See, e.g., NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 161, at 483 (arguing that “[t]he 
reference to non-conforming measures is simply another way to refer to express 
reservations to the treaty”); see also Stumberg, supra note 151, at 403 (observing that 
“[s]ome investment arbitrators and commentators view NPM and exception as 
interchangeable concepts, depending on the plain language of the text”) (footnotes 
omitted). 
 207. For the WTO jurisprudence interpreting and applying general exceptions 
under Article XX of the GATT, see, for instance, WTO Analytical Index: Vol. 1, supra 
note 158, ¶¶ 844–955. 
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concluded by the United States, while other countries largely rely on 
exceptions.208 
 Overall, there is no consistency in the practice of individual states 
with respect to providing for exceptions and other safeguard provisions 
in investor protection treaties. A state may include exceptions in some 
of its BITs but not in others. It may also use varying terminology across 
a treaty. For instance, the United States and Uruguay employ the term 
non-conforming measures in Article 14 of the U.S.-Uruguay BIT 
(2005),209 but in Article 18(2) of the same treaty they utilize the term 
preclude to reserve for the state parties the right to adopt measures 
necessary for the protection of essential security—which indicates a 
non-precluded measure.210 
 Studies of safeguard provisions in IIAs report that exceptions are 
generally rare in the context of BITs,211 but are more common in recent 
FTAs and the newest generation of BITs.212 Some scholars have even 
suggested that BITs are no longer exclusively investor protection 
treaties.213 Instead, they argue, there is a substantial element of 
protection of states and the states’ right to regulate, although usually 
only in “exceptional circumstances.”214 
 At the end of the day, the application of a safeguard provision in 
ISDS depends on interpretation of the treaty text by a tribunal. To 
date, tribunal interpretations of exceptions in ISDS have been rare215 
                                                                                                                       
 208. See Stumberg, supra note 151, at 403 (noting that “[w]hat some call an NPM, 
however, Canada, Singapore, Mexico, India, Korea and other countries call exceptions in 
both investment and trade agreements” (footnote omitted)). 
 209. Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investment, U.S.-Uru., art. 14, Nov. 4, 2005, S. TREATY DOC. No. 109-9. 
 210. Id., art. 18 (providing that “nothing in this Treaty shall be construed . . . to 
preclude a Party from applying measures that it considers necessary for the fulfillment 
of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace 
or security, or the protection of its own essential security interests” (emphasis added)). 
 211. See, e.g., Ostřanský, supra note 160, at 2 (“Exception clauses are not rare 
feature of IIAs – they appear in bilateral investment treaties (‘BITs’) entered into by 
Canada, the United States, Switzerland, China, Colombia and New Zealand. They are 
increasingly being included in newly concluded Free Trade Agreements (‘FTAs’). 
Nevertheless, it cannot be said that they are a regular type of provisions, as they are 
estimated to appear in approximately only 10 per cent of IIAs.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 212. See Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 160, at 313 (establishing in 2008 
that at least 10 percent of BITs (two hundred treaties of about two thousand BITs then 
in force) have clauses on non-precluded measures). 
 213. Id. at 316 (“[This] Article’s first theoretical contribution is to question the 
standard assumption that BITs are solely the instruments of investment protection by 
recognizing that such treaties often incorporate significant exceptions that preserve 
state freedom of action in exceptional circumstances.”). 
 214. Id. 
 215. See, e.g., id. at 337 (“Despite the prevalence of NPM clauses in BITs, they were 
not a focus of investor-state arbitration until the Argentine financial collapse of 2001–
2002.”). 
398       VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 50:355 
 
and inconsistent.216 Where exceptions are available under the treaty, 
they may serve as a safeguard mechanism ensuring that more weight 
is given to the state’s regulatory interests than to the rights of foreign 
investors. Yet, it is unclear whether arbitral tribunals will be willing 
to give a particular exception a broad interpretation, or, instead, will 
subject a state’s regulatory interest to its investor protection 
obligations.217 
 Finally, judging by the WTO jurisprudence and the decisions of 
arbitral tribunals interpreting exceptions and exclusions provisions, it 
is unclear whether exceptions expand or narrow a state’s right to 
regulate. Some scholars have argued that, apart from a greater 
certainty of law, exceptions add little to the IIA regime, as arbitral 
tribunals have recognized a state’s right to regulate even in the 
absence of explicit provisions to this effect.218 Others have suggested 
that exceptions provisions in IIAs may in fact limit a state’s right to 
regulate.219 For instance, the nexus requirement in the general 
exception can limit the scope of a state’s regulatory power by allowing 
the state to adopt only those measures which are necessary for the 
achievement of a legitimate public policy goal. Interpreted in the most 
narrow way—that is, applying a “but for” requirement under 
customary international law—such a condition would clear fewer 
regulatory measures than the state could generally adopt for 
legitimate public policy objectives. 
                                                                                                                       
 216. Burke-White and von Staden are very critical of the tribunal’s interpretation 
of the NPM clause in the United States and Argentina BIT Treaty Concerning the 
Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment. Arg.-U.S., art. XI, Nov. 14, 
1991, S. TREATY DOC. No. 103-2, and the necessity defense under customary 
international law in three arbitrations involving Argentina. See also CMS Gas 
Transmission Co. v. Arg., Case No. ARB/01/8, Final Award (ICSID May 12, 2005), 
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C4/DC504_En.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NL2L-LHFL] (archived Jan. 20, 2017); LG&E Energy Corp. v. Arg., 
Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability (ICSID Oct. 3, 2006), http://www.italaw.com/ 
sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0460.pdf [https://perma.cc/F9ZL-337E] (archived 
Jan. 20, 2017); Enron Corp. v. Arg., Case No. ARB/01/3, Award (ICSID May 22, 2007), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0293.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
35AY-6REX] (archived Jan. 20, 2017). 
 217. For instance, the state’s right to regulate appears to be secondary and 
subordinated to the investor rights in treaties permitting the state to adopt any measure 
“otherwise consistent with” the BIT or investment chapter in the FTA. See TPP, supra 
note 3, art. 9.16 (demonstrating the wording of these provisions suggests that the state’s 
measure may not be in breach of the investor protection obligations and, as such, more 
narrow that the general right to regulate).  
 218. See, e.g., Jörn Griebel, The New EU Investment Policy Approach, in 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: A HANDBOOK 304, 317–18 (Marc Bungenberg et al. 
eds., 2015) (“Explicit clauses would therefore only have the effect to codify such 
tendencies and to provide for greater certainty of law.”). 
 219. See, e.g., Stumberg, supra note 151, at 417–18 (noting that additional 
restrictions prevent countries from “abusing” the exceptions). 
2017] THE RIGHT TO REGULATE IN INVESTOR–STATE ARBITRATION 399 
 
C. The TPP Tobacco Carve-Out 
1. Analyzing the Treaty Provisions 
 The TPP is the largest and most complex trade liberalization and 
investment agreement ever signed. It is also particularly rich in 
exceptions, exclusions, carve-outs, exceptions to exceptions, and other 
safeguard provisions.220 For the ISDS regime, the most notable of these 
provisions is the tobacco carve-out contained in Article 29.5 (Tobacco 
Control Measures) of Chapter 29 (Exceptions and General Provisions). 
The article provides as follows: 
A Party may elect to deny the benefits of Section B of Chapter 9 (Investment) 
with respect to claims challenging a tobacco control measure of the Party. Such 
a claim shall not be submitted to arbitration under Section B of Chapter 9 
(Investment) if a Party has made such an election. If a Party has not elected to 
deny benefits with respect to such claims by the time of the submission of such a 
claim to arbitration under Section B of Chapter 9 (Investment), a Party may elect 
to deny benefits during the proceedings. For greater certainty, if a Party elects 
to deny benefits with respect to such claims, any such claim shall be 
dismissed.221 
 There are also two footnotes to this article that explain the 
operation of the carve-out with respect to the TPP’s denial-of-benefits 
and state-to-state dispute settlement provisions and define the term 
tobacco control measure. The first of them—footnote 11—clarifies that 
                                                                                                                       
 220. See, e.g., Thomas J. Bollyky, TPP Tobacco Exception Proves the New Rule in 
Trade, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.cfr.org/trade/tpp-
tobacco-exception-proves-new-rule-trade/p37509 [https://perma.cc/ZGE5-RGRU] 
(archived Jan. 20, 2017) (“At nearly 2,700 pages, the TPP may be the longest, most 
complex, and exception-filled trade agreement ever negotiated. There are exceptions to 
general principle (Art. 2.4.1), exceptions to exceptions (Art. 2.4.7), explicit exclusions 
(Art. 9.11), implicit exclusions (Annex 15-A), grandfathering (Annex 18-B), optional 
undertakings (Art. 25.4.1), clarifications (Art. 13.2.3), caveats (Art. 11.1), limiting rules 
of application (Art. 11.2.2-5), and, of course, carve-outs (Annex 17-D; Art. 16.9; 
Art. 9.7.6). Exceptions appear in nearly every chapter of the TPP, including its 
preamble.”). 
 221. TPP, supra note 3, art. 29.5. (footnotes omitted). The wording of the tobacco 
carve-out provision is reminiscent of the denial-of-benefits provisions common for 
modern IIAs. However, the TPP already contains a separate denial-of-benefits provision 
in Article 9.15 of the investment chapter. By contrast, the tobacco carve-out is included 
in another chapter of the TPP—Chapter 29 “Exceptions and General Provisions.” 
Furthermore, a footnote to Article 29.5 of the TPP specifically indicates that the article 
does not preclude the operation of the TPP’s denial-of-benefits provision. As such, two 
provisions appear to be distinct and have different scopes of application. Noticeably, 
unlike regular denial-of-benefits provisions, the tobacco carve-out only covers the ISDS 
benefit of the TPP. It does not allow to deny the benefits of substantive investor 
protections that may be denied under denial-of-benefits provisions. The carve-out can 
also be employed after the benefit of ISDS is invoked by a foreign investor by filing a 
claim in arbitration. Consequently, the tobacco carve-out is a distinctly unique provision, 
unlike any other safeguard provision or denial-of-benefits provision known to IIAs. 
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“[f]or greater certainty, this Article does not prejudice: (i) the operation 
of Article 9.15 (Denial of Benefits); or (ii) a Party’s rights under 
Chapter 28 (Dispute Settlement) in relation to a tobacco control 
measure.”222 The second footnote—footnote 12—defines a tobacco 
control measure as “a measure of a Party related to the production or 
consumption of manufactured tobacco products (including products 
made or derived from tobacco), their distribution, labelling, packaging, 
advertising, marketing, promotion, sale, purchase, or use, as well as 
enforcement measures, such as inspection, recordkeeping, and 
reporting requirements.”223 This definition is exceptionally broad and 
visibly seeks to encompass an absolute majority of the tobacco 
industry’s operations, as well as the consumption of tobacco. The 
definition appears to exclude the “agricultural tobacco production,”224 
as the footnote concludes by noting that “[f]or greater certainty, a 
measure with respect to tobacco leaf that is not in the possession of a 
manufacturer of tobacco products or that is not part of a manufactured 
tobacco product is not a tobacco control measure.”225 
 The tobacco carve-out under Article 29.5 of the TPP is distinct 
from any other safeguard provision in international investment law. 
Most strikingly, it deals only with a procedural obligation of investor 
protection by giving the host state the option to deny the benefits of 
ISDS with respect to a claim challenging a tobacco control measure. 
Accordingly, the TPP tobacco carve-out does not reserve the regulatory 
space for the treaty parties with respect to tobacco production, 
marketing, sale, use, or consumption. It only targets ISDS by allowing 
a state party to revoke its (offer of) consent to ISDS under the TPP. By 
contrast, other exceptions and exclusions in the investor protection 
agreements focus on reserving for the state the right to regulate a 
particular industry or a type of activity. Apart from the TPP, not a 
single investor protection agreement provides the state with the ability 
to avoid ISDS on a case-by-case basis when a dispute arises. This 
means Article 29.5 is not a subject-matter (tobacco) carve-out from the 
TPP, but rather an option for the subject-matter jurisdictional 
exclusion from ISDS. 
 Another distinction between this tobacco carve-out and other 
safeguard provisions is the option it gives to the host state to deny the 
benefits of ISDS with respect to a claim related to a tobacco control 
measure. This option can be exercised prior to the submission of a claim 
to investment treaty arbitration, or after the investor–state arbitration 
has commenced—which is especially worrisome, in my view. This puts 
the claimant and the tribunal in the uncomfortable position of not 
                                                                                                                       
 222. TPP, supra note 3, art. 29.5 n.11. 
 223. Id. art. 29.5 n.12. 
 224. See Bollyky, supra note 220. 
 225. TPP, supra note 3, art. 29.5 n.12. 
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knowing whether their arbitration will proceed, bringing uncertainty 
to the arbitral process. 
 Furthermore, the TPP tobacco carve-out does not prohibit state-
to-state arbitration.226 It also does not guide the claimant as to the 
availability of an alternative forum for its claim. The tobacco carve-out 
does not even seek to provide the host state with the regulatory space 
to freely regulate the tobacco industry, the use and consumption of 
tobacco products, or the effects of tobacco on the environment. Instead, 
the primary and only focus of the carve-out is ISDS, or, more 
specifically, ensuring that a defending state may revoke jurisdiction of 
an investment treaty tribunal over claims challenging a tobacco control 
measure. 
 A bigger problem with the proposed TPP tobacco carve-out is that 
it provides the host state with the ability to unilaterally revoke its offer 
of consent to investor–state arbitration. This goes against the 
fundamental principle of irrevocability of consent in ISDS. According 
to this principle, once a foreign investor perfects a state’s consent to 
ISDS by submitting a claim to arbitration, a party to a dispute cannot 
unilaterally revoke its consent.227 And yet, this is exactly what the TPP 
tobacco carve-out allows the host state to do. Such an option directly 
contradicts the provisions of the ICSID Convention,228 which is one of 
the alternative mechanisms of arbitration that can be chosen by a 
claimant under Article 9.19.4 of the TPP.229 
 Will this tobacco carve-out permit the state to regulate the tobacco 
industry without the fear that its regulatory measures might be 
challenged by a foreign investor? I strongly doubt it. It is of course true 
that, if under Article 29.5 a host state elects to deny the benefits of 
ISDS with respect to a claim, the state will generally avoid an investor–
state arbitration with regard to a tobacco control measure. However, 
the TPP’s tobacco carve-out does not make the state free to adopt 
measures necessary to protect human life, health, or the environment 
                                                                                                                       
 226. TPP, supra note 3, art. 29.5 n.11 (noting that “[f]or greater certainty, this 
Article does not prejudice: (i) the operation of Article 9.15 (Denial of Benefits); or (ii) a 
Party’s rights under Chapter 28 (Dispute Settlement) in relation to a tobacco control 
measure”). 
 227. See, e.g., DUGAN ET AL., supra note 85, at 222 (“It is generally accepted that 
once a state has given its consent to arbitrate investment disputes and this consent has 
been perfected, it cannot be revoked unilaterally.” (footnote omitted)). See also RUDOLF 
DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 254 
(2012) (discussing that apart from treaties, such as BITs and other IIAs, consent to 
investment arbitration may be given in domestic laws of the host state or in an 
investment contract between the parties, for instance, a concession agreement). 
 228. ICSID Convention, supra note 18, art. 25(1) (“When the parties have given 
their consent, no party may withdraw its consent unilaterally.”). 
 229. TPP, supra note 3, art. 9.19.4 (“The claimant may submit a claim referred to 
in paragraph 1 under one of the following alternatives: (a) the ICSID Convention and 
the ICSID Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings, provided that both the 
respondent and the Party of the claimant are parties to the ICSID Convention.”). 
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from the effects of tobacco. Article 29.5 on its own does not eliminate a 
state’s substantive obligations, given to foreign investors, including 
those in the tobacco industry. There is certainly nothing to this effect 
in the carve-out itself, which, on its face, is concerned with avoiding 
ISDS but not with strengthening a state’s right to regulate for the 
benefit of the public. Consequently, if a dispute arises with regard to a 
tobacco control measure, a foreign investor might still have a 
substantive claim, but, without ISDS, may not have a meaningful 
forum in which to submit it. 
 Moreover, the tobacco carve-out in the TPP does not help a 
defending state either. If a dispute escalates into litigation or 
arbitration, a defending state will not be able to invoke the tobacco 
carve-out in its defense. As just argued, Article 29.5 of the TPP does 
not grant the right to regulate as such. A defending state could look for 
alternative safeguards in the TPP, such as Article 9.16 (Investment 
and Environmental, Health and Other Regulatory Objectives)230—one 
of the exceptions in the investment chapter. However, this article also 
does not secure a state’s right to regulate for legitimate public policy 
objectives, such as the protection of public health. Instead, it reiterates 
the host state’s right to regulate foreign investors “to ensure that 
investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive 
to environmental, health or other regulatory objectives.”231 
 To successfully invoke Article 9.16 in a dispute resolution, the host 
state would have to ensure that any government measure adopted 
pursuant to Article 9.16 falls within the scope of the article’s regulatory 
objectives. The state will also have to demonstrate that its measures 
were directed to the regulation of a foreign investor’s activity in its 
territory, but not to the regulation for the benefit of the public at large. 
For instance, Australia would not be able to invoke Article 9.16 of the 
TPP to defend its plain tobacco packaging legislation precisely because 
its legislation has a broad public policy objective—the protection of 
public health.232 The case would be different if Australia sought to 
regulate Philip Morris’s operations in Australia to ensure that the 
tobacco company operates in a manner sensitive to the country’s 
regulatory objectives. Some may disagree with this interpretation of 
Article 9.16 of the TPP, but an analysis of its text indicates that a host 
state will certainly have less leeway to successfully invoke Article 9.16 
                                                                                                                       
 230. TPP, supra note 3, art. 9.16 (providing that “[n]othing in this Chapter shall be 
construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining or enforcing any measure 
otherwise consistent with this Chapter that it considers appropriate to ensure that 
investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to 
environmental, health or other regulatory objectives”). 
 231. Id. art. 9.16. 
 232. See Philip Morris Asia, supra note 1 (noting that this proposition is what 
Australia argued in its investor–state arbitration with Philip Morris). 
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than, for instance, to rely on a general exception under Article XX of 
the GATT. 
 Additionally, the TPP requires the host state’s measures under 
Article 9.16 to be “otherwise consistent” with Chapter 9 of the TPP—
the investment chapter.233 This requirement makes any policy-making 
initiatives by a host state pursuant to Article 9.16 secondary and 
subordinated to the rights of a foreign investor in the host state.234 As 
a result, a host state will have to ensure that its regulatory measures 
under Article 9.16 are consistent with its investor protection 
obligations under Chapter 9 of the TPP. In contrast, more broadly 
worded general exceptions allow the host state to adopt regulatory 
measures in deviation from its investor protection obligations under 
the IIA regime. Consequently, Article 9.16 of the TPP will be relevant 
and applicable only to some government measures seeking to regulate 
the activities of the foreign investors in the country. Article 9.16 will 
not provide the host state with the regulatory space for broad domestic 
policymaking. 
 Other provisions of the TPP that can be of use for state parties 
seeking to protect their regulatory measures include Article 9.12 (Non-
Conforming Measures) and paragraph 3(b) of Annex 9-B 
(Expropriation). In particular, Annex 9-B seeks to distinguish between 
legitimate regulatory measures and indirect expropriation. In doing so, 
it gives a very strong level of protection to the state’s regulatory power 
by providing that “[n]on-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party 
that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare 
objectives, such as public health, safety and the environment, do not 
constitute indirect expropriation, except in rare circumstances.”235 
 This provision thus establishes a very high threshold for proving 
indirect expropriation, limiting it to instances of discriminatory 
regulatory actions by the state. Other exceptions in the TPP are either 
not applicable to the investment chapter (e.g., general exceptions 
under Article 29.1236) or are not relevant to measures adopted for 
                                                                                                                       
 233. TPP, supra note 3, art. 9.16. 
 234. See, e.g., Ostřanský, supra note 160, at 3 (“In this sense, the idea of pursuing 
policy ends . . . is an exception, whilst following international investment obligations is 
the norm. Viewed in this way, we see that international investment law positions itself 
as superior to domestic considerations, and as the ultimate arbiter of what policy 
objectives may or may not be pursued.”). 
 235. TPP, supra note 3, annex 9-B, ¶ 3(b), n.37 (providing (within the Article’s 
footnote): “[f]or greater certainty and without limiting the scope of this subparagraph, 
regulatory actions to protect public health include, among others, such measures with 
respect to the regulation, pricing and supply of, and reimbursement for, pharmaceuticals 
(including biological products), diagnostics, vaccines, medical devices, gene therapies 
and technologies, health-related aids and appliances and blood and blood-related 
products”). 
 236. TPP, supra note 3, art. 29.1. Article 29.1 on general exceptions incorporates 
and makes part of the TPP agreement Article XX of GATT 1994 and its interpretative 
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general public welfare objectives because of their specific public policy 
goals (e.g., “maintenance or restoration of international peace or 
security, or the protection of [a State’s] own essential security 
interests” under Article 29.2;237 or “adopting or maintaining restrictive 
measures with regard to payments or transfers relating to the 
movement of capital” under Article 29.3.2238). 
 As a legal rule, the TPP tobacco carve-out will most likely not 
produce the effect it is meant to achieve: to allow a state to freely 
regulate the tobacco industry. This TPP provision is also questionable 
as to its consistency with a state’s other international law obligations, 
such as those under the ICSID Convention, as it allows a defending 
state to unilaterally revoke its consent to ISDS. But the tobacco carve-
out is also a bad public policy choice. It leaves foreign investors that 
have claims under the TPP’s investment chapter without a meaningful 
dispute resolution forum in which to pursue their claims. It also raises 
an array of difficult questions as to what other regulatory measures, if 
any, should be protected with individual jurisdictional carve-outs. 
 From a public policy perspective, the tobacco industry is an easy 
target. There is a strong consensus among scientists that tobacco 
consumption negatively affects every part of the human body, 
increasing the chances of developing cancer, heart disease, stroke, and 
many other health issues. According to the National Cancer Institute, 
smoking “causes cancers of the lung, esophagus, larynx, mouth, throat, 
kidney, bladder, liver, pancreas, stomach, cervix, colon, and rectum, as 
well as acute myeloid leukemia.”239 Most people would probably 
concede that there is a strong need for government regulation in this 
industry. But how to provide for a state’s regulatory power with respect 
to other sectors and activities in the IIA regime is a difficult question. 
What areas should be included on a list of legitimate regulatory 
objectives? Soda drinks portion limits? Genetically modified food? 
Atomic energy? Should there be similar jurisdictional carve-outs in 
trade and investment agreements for these as well? In other words, 
how do we identify sectors and activities that warrant carve-outs from 
those that do not? 
 The answers to these difficult questions require balancing 
important public policy objectives and making hard choices. However, 
it is absolutely clear that a state cannot afford to protect its domestic 
                                                                                                                       
notes, as well as article XIV of GATS, to a list of enumerated chapters of the TPP. 
Chapter 9 on investment is not listed among these chapters, making general exceptions 
not applicable to investment chapter. 
 237. Id. art. 29.2. 
 238. Id. art. 29.3.2. 
 239. Harms of Cigarette Smoking and Health Benefits of Quitting, NAT’L CANCER 
INST. (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.cancer.gov/about-cancer/causes-prevention/risk/tobacco/ 
cessation-fact-sheet#r1 [https://perma.cc/JHH2-VANX] (archived Jan. 23, 2017). 
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policymaking by incorporating individual carve-outs for each sector or 
activity it wants to regulate. 
2. The Tobacco Carve-Out as Part of the Global Reform of ISDS 
 On a broader scale, looking at the structural, procedural, and 
substantive changes to ISDS together, it is immediately clear that 
removing the most contentious public policy claims from the 
jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals is not a solution to the problem of 
regulatory disputes. 
 First, unless there is an alternative treaty regime, as is the case 
for taxation matters, industry-specific carve-outs do not make sense in 
view of the improvements introduced to ISDS to date. Take, for 
instance, transparency and legitimacy initiatives. Implemented 
successfully, they will convert ISDS into the most competent 
instrument of investment dispute resolution. No other court in the 
world would be better positioned to resolve regulatory disputes than 
ISDS in its improved version. 
 Second, by removing the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals over a 
whole industry or sector, investors are deprived of the benefits of ISDS 
and left with no other option but to resort to domestic courts or 
diplomatic protection240—the same mechanisms ISDS was created to 
replace. Yet, due to the perceived bias of domestic courts and state 
immunity concerns, litigating investment disputes in the courts of the 
host state or any other country is not an ideal, or even a feasible, option 
due to state immunity that sovereign states generally enjoy. 
Furthermore, litigating disputes over state regulatory measures is an 
even more challenging task because of their public policy implications. 
Nevertheless, foreign investors will have no other forum but domestic 
courts unless they are allowed to use investor–state arbitration. 
 Third, international arbitral tribunals have long proved capable 
of resolving public policy concerns in the context of private dispute 
resolution.241 Investor–state arbitration, because of its hybrid242 
origin, is even better positioned to take into account public policy 
                                                                                                                       
 240. For instance, the tobacco carve-out in the TPP does not prejudice the state 
parties’ rights under Chapter 28 (Dispute Settlement). Consequently, a foreign investor 
may seek assistance of its home state to commence a dispute settlement procedure under 
TPP’s Chapter 28 with respect to a tobacco control measure. 
 241. Vera Korzun, Arbitrating Antitrust Claims: From Suspicion to Trust, 48 N.Y.U. 
J. INT’L L. & POL. 867, 930 (2016) (arguing that international arbitration “has repeatedly 
proved capable of settling private disputes involving public policy concerns, such as 
international arbitration of domestic antitrust claims . . . [and] has gained trust not only 
from private parties choosing arbitration for the resolution of their international 
disputes, but also from national courts and public antitrust authorities”). 
 242. See generally Douglas, supra note 37. 
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considerations. There is no reason to doubt the ability of arbitrators to 
address regulatory disputes in investor–state arbitrations. 
 With these considerations in mind, we should reconsider and 
avoid jurisdictional subject-matter carve-outs, unless there is an 
alternative treaty regime in place for the subject matter we seek to 
exclude. For instance, tax carve-outs—the most recognized subject-
matter exclusions to the IIA regime to date—have arguably worked 
because tax matters generally fall under a network of tax treaties that 
have their own dispute resolution mechanisms.243 In the case of the 
tobacco industry, and other sectors and activities that may follow in 
the footsteps of the TPP tobacco carve-out, there is no comparable 
international law regime in place. 
 Consequently, the TPP tobacco carve-out is anything but the gold 
standard for regulatory objectives. The tobacco carve-out does not help 
anyone. It does not help sovereign states in securing regulatory space 
for tobacco control measures, and it certainly does not help foreign 
investors in the tobacco industry, as they will not know in advance 
whether they can rely on the benefits of ISDS. Moreover, investors can 
be deprived of such benefits even after they submit a claim to 
arbitration. 
 In addition, once a claim with a reference to a tobacco control 
measure is submitted to arbitration, one can expect “fights for 
jurisdiction” by arbitral tribunals in instances where it is unclear 
whether a tobacco control measure is being challenged in arbitration 
or, instead, is being invoked by a claimant to substantiate its claim of 
expropriation or violation of the FET standard. The outcome of these 
fights for jurisdiction will often depend on the standard used by 
arbitral tribunals (e.g., relying on the self-judging principle, or seeking 
a joint determination by the state parties) in determining what 
constitutes a claim “challenging a tobacco control measure of the Party” 
under Article 29.5 of the TPP.244 
 When such preliminary issues arise in an international 
commercial arbitration, courts are always there as a fallback solution 
for disputing parties. There is no such luxury for foreign investors in 
the ISDS world. Once the ISDS option falls apart, a foreign investor 
would have to revert to the outdated methods of investment dispute 
resolution that ISDS sought to replace—diplomatic protection or 
                                                                                                                       
 243. See generally JULIEN CHAISSE, E15INITIATIVE, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
LAW AND TAXATION: FROM COEXISTENCE TO COOPERATION (2016), http://e15initiative. 
org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/E15-Investment-Chaisse-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
QML6-JKPD] (archived Mar. 6, 2017) (discussing the coexistence of tax treaties and 
international investment agreements, including the dispute resolution mechanisms 
under such instruments of international law). See also Thomas Wälde, National Tax 
Measures Affecting Foreign Investors under the Discipline of International Investment 
Treaties, 102 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 55 (2008). 
 244. TPP, supra note 3, art. 29.5 (footnotes omitted). 
2017] THE RIGHT TO REGULATE IN INVESTOR–STATE ARBITRATION 407 
 
litigation in the (biased) domestic courts of the host state where an 
investment treaty is self-executing and provides a private right of 
action.245 These are very unfortunate projections for the TPP, 
considering the undeniable merits and track record of investment 
treaty arbitration. 
D. Seeking Alternative Solutions 
 The nature of ISDS claims has evolved over the years from 
relatively simple claims of discrimination and expropriation to claims 
challenging the legitimacy of government measures as part of a claim 
of regulatory expropriation or FET violation. Multinational 
corporations have acquired, through ISDS, an unprecedented 
opportunity to interfere with a government’s ability to regulate for the 
public interest, encroaching on a core feature of state sovereignty. 
Multinational corporations have also demonstrated the willingness to 
invoke their ISDS right, at times employing inventive treaty- and 
forum-shopping techniques in search of a more beneficial investor 
protection regime. 
 In response to these downsides of modern ISDS, governments and 
other stakeholders have introduced a series of procedural and 
structural changes to ISDS, focusing on increasing transparency, 
consistency, and the overall legitimacy of investor–state arbitration. To 
address concerns over regulatory disputes, they have also sought to 
clarify their substantive investor protection obligations, to revoke the 
offer to arbitrate in IIAs, or to withdraw from the ICSID Convention. 
Along these lines, the drafters of the TPP have attempted the most 
inventive approach to date: a tobacco carve-out as the first ever subject-
matter jurisdictional exclusion. Yet, as argued above, the tobacco 
carve-out on its own, and, even together with other safeguard 
provisions in the TPP, is unable to resolve the challenges posed by 
regulatory disputes. Consequently, alternative solutions are needed to 
ensure that a balance is reached in ISDS between the interests of a 
state in preserving space for domestic policymaking and the interests 
of foreign investors who choose to invest in the host state in part 
relying on offered investor protections. 
 But, first and foremost, irrespective of the forum used to resolve 
investment disputes—arbitration or domestic or international courts—
the substantive investor protection regime must be improved. Arbitral 
                                                                                                                       
 245. See, e.g., Roger Alford, BIT Provisions That are Self-Executing But Do Not Confer 
a Private Right of Action, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Sept. 30, 2011), http://kluwerarbitrationblog 
.com/2011/09/30/bit-provisions-that-are-self-executing-but-do-not-confer-a-private-right-
of-action/ [https://perma.cc/YX2F-728D] (archived Jan. 23, 2017) (pointing to the U.S.-
Rwanda BIT as an example of an investor protection treaty with both self-executing and 
non-self-executing provisions, but providing no private rights of action enforceable in 
U.S. courts). 
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tribunals and courts interpret and apply provisions of investment 
treaties in the merit phase of international dispute resolution. If no 
reference to the right to regulate is made in a treaty, any of these 
dispute resolution institutions may apply textualism and conclude that 
no right to regulate is reserved for a state, thus shifting the balance to 
foreign investors. Although the chances of this happening are slim in 
modern ISDS, it is still prudent to include a reference to the right to 
regulate in BITs and other IIAs. 
 First, the right to regulate for legitimate government objectives 
should be included in the preamble of investor protection agreements. 
Arbitral tribunals and state parties may not view such a reference as 
creating an international law obligation, but it can serve as an 
indication that the right to regulate is reserved for the host state. The 
list of public policy objectives for state regulation can be tailored for 
the needs of treaty parties, but, at a minimum, should include the 
protection of human life, health, and the environment. 
 Second, the right to regulate in the context of a non-expropriation 
obligation raises fewer concerns. Investor protection treaties typically 
include comprehensive provisions on expropriation and may also 
address regulatory expropriation. Even where no right to regulate is 
mentioned in the treaty, arbitral tribunals have consistently 
acknowledged a state’s right to regulate. Over the years tribunals have 
developed a very high threshold for establishing indirect expropriation. 
Here, adding a separate clause to the treaty providing that, in the 
absence of discrimination, regulatory measures do not amount to 
expropriation could further strengthen the state in the IIA regime.246 
Such a provision would prevent investors from bringing frivolous 
claims and would provide guidance to arbitral tribunals with regard to 
distinguishing between instances of legitimate non-compensable 
regulation and indirect expropriation. 
 Third, there is a strong need for clear criteria in arbitration to 
identify when regulation by a host state may amount to a FET 
violation. Presently, arbitral tribunals are left to their own devices in 
identifying and establishing such criteria. In attempting to balance the 
right of the state against the rights of investors, they have generally 
relied on the proportionality criteria and showed deference to the 
state’s own determination. Yet a clear rule would contribute to the 
predictability of the ISDS regime and would certainly eliminate 
frivolous claims of a FET violation through challenges of government 
measures. 
 Fourth, exceptions and other safeguard provisions provide a 
critical safety net for all other challenges to a state’s regulatory 
                                                                                                                       
 246. For instance, treaty drafters may follow the example of the TPP, which already 
includes such a provision in its annex on expropriation. See TPP, supra note 3, annex 9-
B, ¶ 3(b) (footnote omitted). 
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measures through ISDS. General exceptions are especially useful in 
this respect, as they allow a state to adopt measures that deviate from 
its investor protection obligations. Yet, as Robert Stumberg has 
pointed out, general exceptions in trade liberalization and investment 
agreements may not be general in their scope.247 For instance, in the 
U.S. FTA practice, the GATT/GATS general exceptions are made 
applicable only to select chapters of a treaty, which do not include the 
investment chapter.248 The most recent example of this practice is the 
TPP itself. It incorporates by reference and makes part of the TPP, 
mutatis mutandis, Article XX of GATT 1994 and its interpretative 
notes, as well as Article XIV of GATS, but not for the purposes of 
Chapter 9 (Investments).249 Thus, the general exceptions of the TPP do 
not apply to the investment chapter and cannot be used as an 
affirmative defense for breaches of investor protection obligations 
under the TPP. This treaty practice should be reconsidered, as legal 
scholars have suggested.250 The state’s regulatory power can be better 
protected by ensuring that exceptions are available and applicable to 
the investment chapters in FTAs.251 For instance, treaties may follow 
the example of the ChAFTA, which incorporates a separate article on 
general exceptions directly into the investment chapter.252 
 The above changes would improve the substantive law and 
provide a better balance between the state’s right to regulate and the 
investor protection rights. They do not, however, address how the 
institutional and procedural mechanisms for resolution of investment 
disputes can be improved. Since foreign investors do not entirely trust 
the impartiality of the domestic courts of a host state, and state parties 
do not trust private arbitrators’ ability to make public policy 
determinations, these two systems of dispute resolution should be 
                                                                                                                       
 247. See Stumberg, supra note 151, at 406 (“In the U.S. model for exceptions in 
FTAs, the general exception is not truly general. The scope element incorporates the 
GATT/GATS exception by reference and applies it to selected chapters, including market 
access for goods, technical barriers to trade, and cross-border services, among others. It 
does not apply the exception to chapters on investment or intellectual property.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 248. Note that the United States has currently in force FTAs with twenty countries. 
Where such treaties incorporate by reference the GATT/GATS general exceptions, none 
of these treaties makes general exceptions applicable to the investment chapter. See, e.g., 
OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, UNITED STATES-PERU FREE TRADE 
AGREEMENT, U.S.-PERU, ch. 22, art. 22.1, Apr. 12, 2006, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/ 
files/uploads/agreements/fta/peru/asset_upload_file841_9542.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
RRX5-G2VN] (archived Jan. 23, 2017). 
 249. See TPP, supra note 3, art. 29.1.1–3. 
 250. See Stumberg, supra note 151, at 406–07 (arguing for the expansion of the 
scope of the general exception and providing a table with precedents from several TPP 
countries—Brunei, Canada, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam—
which already have FTAs with general exceptions applicable to investment chapters). 
 251. Id. 
 252. ChAFTA, supra note 22, ch. 9, art 9.8. 
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combined by supplementing investor–state arbitration with the 
availability of limited court review. 
 An excellent example of how to procedurally structure such a 
system comes from the international commercial arbitration of 
antitrust claims.253 There, private arbitral tribunals are allowed to 
consider antitrust claims as part of international commercial dispute 
resolution. In addition, domestic courts reserve the right to review the 
resultant arbitral awards on the public policy ground in setting aside 
and recognition and enforcement proceedings.254 And, judging by the 
lack of review on the merits and the very few challenges to such awards 
in domestic courts, the system works very well.255 Further, there are 
many benefits to it. For private parties, it provides all the advantages 
of international commercial arbitration. For states and courts, it saves 
on the social cost of litigating antitrust issues in addition to arbitrating 
the commercial aspects of the parties’ dispute. But, through their 
courts, states also keep the power of review to ensure that 
international arbitration is not used to evade mandatory domestic 
antitrust law. For arbitrators, this process provides incentives—
enforced by the reputation mechanism—to ensure that antitrust law is 
considered in arbitration and the resultant award is enforceable in 
domestic courts. 
 A similar mechanism could be employed in ISDS. To achieve this, 
the state would have to limit its consent to ISDS to the arbitration 
rules of international commercial arbitration, most notably, the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.256 This would subject arbitrations 
                                                                                                                       
 253. See generally Korzun, supra note 241. 
 254. See, e.g., UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 
Article 24(2)(b)(ii), 1985 (with amendments as adopted in 2006); G.A. Res. 40/72, United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/72 (Dec. 11, 1985) amended 
by G.A. Res 61/33, U.N Doc. A/RES/61/33, at art. 34(2)(b)(ii) (Dec. 18, 2006). For 
recognition and enforcement, see Article V(2)(b) of the 1958 United Nations Convention 
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New York 
Convention). United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, art. V(2)(b) [hereinafter New York 
Convention]. 
 255. See Korzun, supra note 241, at 927 (observing that “one would certainly expect 
more challenges related to antitrust law than currently appear in the U.S. courts” and 
that “[disputing parties] appear to be willing to comply with antitrust-related arbitral 
awards, without using a second chance to fight such awards in a setting aside or 
enforcement proceeding”). 
 256. UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 20. Most IIAs already include the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules as a set of procedural rules available for conducting 
investor–state arbitration. Court review in setting aside or enforcement proceedings is 
also available for arbitrations under any other rules of international commercial 
arbitration, as well as the ICSID Additional Facility Rules. And so, this proposal would 
not necessarily require conclusion or revision of investment protection treaties to allow 
for application of such rules. However, the choice of procedural rules to conduct investor–
state arbitration is currently left to a foreign investor that might prefer to submit its 
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conducted under these rules to domestic court review on limited 
grounds at the seat of arbitration or the place of enforcement. Such 
court review would largely occur in the domestic courts of a country 
other than the host state.257 These courts may not be as deferential to 
the public policy determinations of the host state. Yet, the availability 
of court review may serve as quality control and an additional incentive 
for arbitral tribunals to ensure that their award is recognized and 
enforced. Additionally, of course, different public policy objectives may 
require different levels of deference on the side of reviewing court. For 
instance, a higher level of deference might be granted to host state 
measures seeking to protect moral values, in contrast to those 
measures adopted to protect public health. 
 For investment treaty arbitrations under the ICSID Convention, 
state parties could expand the grounds for annulment under Article 52 
to include public policy.258 Until such amendments are introduced into 
the ICSID Convention, the states wishing to have a second bite at the 
apple to ensure that their public policy concerns are addressed in 
arbitration, would have to rely on the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. 
The system could also be enforced through reputation mechanisms, 
which are inherently more powerful in investor–state arbitration than 
in international commercial arbitration because of the growing 
transparency of ISDS and the more closely knit family of arbitrators 
deciding investor–state cases.259 
 Finally, the proposed system could also make use of the 
mechanism of joint party determinations, as adopted by ChAFTA. In 
particular, Article 9.11.4 of ChAFTA provides that “[m]easures of a 
Party that are non-discriminatory and for the legitimate public welfare 
                                                                                                                       
claim to arbitration under the ICSID Convention. See ICSID Convention, supra note 18. 
Under the ICSID Convention, the review of arbitral awards is limited to the annulment 
procedure under Article 52 of the Convention. Id., art. 52. The ICSID Convention award 
is also not subject to an appeal and is recognized as binding and enforced under the 
Convention itself (Articles 53–54). The award is therefore outside of the scope of judicial 
control available in the recognition and enforcement proceedings under the New York 
Convention. New York Convention, supra note 254. 
 257. In some instances, host states may be able to submit their setting aside 
application in their own domestic courts. For instance, having lost a NAFTA investor–
state arbitration under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules with the seat in Toronto, 
Ontario, Canada, the country filed for setting aside at the Federal Court of Canada. See 
William Ralph Clayton, William Richard Clayton, Douglas Clayton, Daniel Clayton and 
Bilcon of Delaware Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2009-04, 
Award on Jurisdiction and Liability (Mar. 17, 2015) (addressing arbitral awards). 
 258. ICSID Convention, supra note 18, art. 52. 
 259. See, e.g., EBERHARDT ET AL., supra note 69, at 38–41 (identifying “a group of 15 
arbitrators that can be considered the movers and shakers of international investment 
arbitration,” and presenting data on these 15 elite arbitrators, who together decided on 
“55% (247 cases) out of 450 investment-treaty disputes known today, 64% (79 cases) out 
of 123 treaty disputes of at least $100 million, 75% (12 cases) out of 16 treaty dispute of 
at least $4 billion”). 
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objectives of public health, safety, the environment, public morals or 
public order shall not be the subject of a claim under this Section.”260 
This is a newer mechanism for affording a state regulatory space in the 
investor protection regime.261 The ChAFTA mechanism has a number 
of distinct features. First, the exception in ChAFTA is incorporated into 
an article on consultations, which are a prerequisite for submitting a 
claim to arbitration under the treaty.262 Second, the exception 
supplements the general exceptions article already contained in the 
same investment chapter of ChAFTA, making general exceptions 
directly applicable to investments.263 Consequently, ChAFTA has 
successfully addressed a long-expressed concern that general 
exceptions cannot be used by a defending state in an investment 
arbitration, as most FTAs do not make general exceptions applicable 
to their investment chapters. 
 Third, the exception in Article 9.11.4 also contains a number of 
permissible public welfare objectives. This makes it more likely that a 
government measure would benefit from the exception on one basis or 
another. Most unusually, the exception is not only pronounced in the 
treaty, but is also followed by a procedure that may be invoked by a 
responding state claiming the exception.264 In particular, the state may 
submit a so-called public welfare notice to a foreign investor and a non-
disputing party “specifying the basis for its proposition” that a disputed 
measure falls within the scope of Article 9.11.265 The notice then leads 
to a consultation between the host state and the non-disputing party, 
which triggers an automatic suspension of dispute resolution under the 
treaty for a period of ninety days.266 The consultation allows the state 
parties to make a decision as to whether a challenged measure is “of a 
kind described in [Article 9.11.4].”267 The outcome of such 
consultations is to be made available to the claimant in the case, as 
well as to the general public.268 Under Article 9.18.3, “[a] decision 
between the respondent and the non-disputing Party that a measure 
is of the kind described in Article 9.11.4 shall be binding on a tribunal 
and any decision or award issued by a tribunal must be consistent with 
                                                                                                                       
 260. ChAFTA, supra note 22, art. 9.11.4. 
 261. See, e.g., Anthea Roberts & Richard Braddock, Protecting Public Welfare 
Regulation Through Joint Treaty Party Control: A ChAFTA Innovation, Columbia FDI 
Perspectives, No. 176 (2016) (arguing that “[t]his ChAFTA mechanism represents a new 
step in a broader trend of states seeking to recalibrate the balance between investor 
protection and state sovereignty, and between the interpretative power of arbitral 
tribunals and treaty parties”). 
 262. ChAFTA, supra note 22, art. 9.12.2. 
 263. Id. art. 9.8. 
 264. Id. art. 9.11.5–9.11.8. 
 265. Id. art. 9.11.5. 
 266. Id. art. 9.11.6. 
 267. Id. art. 9.11.6–9.11.8. 
 268. Id. art. 9.11.7. 
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that decision.”269 Furthermore, the host state may rely on the benefits 
of Article 9.11.4 even if it chooses not to file the public welfare notice, 
or, having filed it, fails to reach a decision with the non-disputing 
state.270 
 The above procedure provides an opportunity for state parties to 
jointly interpret the treaty provisions, as applied to a particular 
government measure.271 In doing so, it avoids reliance on self-judging 
criteria that could be abused by a host state.272 However, as Anthea 
Roberts and Richard Braddock observe, foreign investors might be 
critical of the ChAFTA public welfare procedure as “repoliticizing 
investor–state disputes by leaving investors at the mercy of joint 
decisions of the treaty parties.”273 
 A similar mechanism could be used by countries in BITs and other 
IIAs. This would allow a host state to regulate for the public benefit, 
although within the scope of the exception to the state’s investor 
protection regime. Most importantly, the mechanism would allow a 
defending state to invoke the assistance of a non-disputing party—
reminiscent of the requirement for a preliminary ruling from the 
European Court of Justice to interpret the European Union law—
instead of requiring exclusive reliance on the arbitral tribunal for the 
interpretation of treaty provisions. And, for disputes heading to 
investor–state arbitration, such joint determinations could serve as a 
screening mechanism to distinguish non-compensable regulation 
                                                                                                                       
 269. Id. art. 9.18.3. 
 270. ChAFTA, supra note 22, art. 9.11.8. 
 271. Other treaties contain similar provisions on joint determination by state 
parties of issues material to further dispute resolution by arbitral tribunals. See, e.g., 
TPP, supra note 3, art. 29.4.8 (extending application of Article 9.8 (Expropriation and 
Compensation) of the TPP to taxation measures). This is an exception to the general 
exclusion of taxation measures from the application of the TPP agreement. As a 
prerequisite for invoking Article 9.8 and submitting a claim with respect to a taxation 
measure to ISDS, Article 29.4.8 requires that a foreign investor first submits to 
“designated authorities” of the Parties the “issue of whether that taxation measure is not 
an expropriation.” Id. If such authorities do not agree to consider the issue, or accept it 
for consideration but fail to agree that it is “not an expropriation,” the investor may 
proceed with submitting its claim to arbitration under Article 9.19 of the TPP. Id. See 
also TPP, supra note 3, art. 29.4.4 (providing that “an issue . . . . as to whether any 
inconsistency exists between this Agreement and the tax convention [between two or 
more Parties] . . . . shall be referred to the designated authorities of the Parties in 
question.”; id. at art. 29.4.4 (providing that “[a] panel or tribunal [in an arbitration 
initiated under Article 9.19] established to consider a dispute related to a taxation 
measure shall accept as binding a determination of the designated authorities of the 
Parties made under this paragraph”).  
 272. See, e.g., Roberts & Braddock, supra note 261 (observing that “by requiring a 
joint decision of the treaty parties, ChAFTA limits the ability of respondent states to 
abuse the mechanism, which would be a more significant risk if the clause were self-
judging”). 
 273. Id. 
414       VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 50:355 
 
subject to the treaty exception from other instances of regulation to be 
reviewed and assessed in ISDS. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 Investor–state arbitration—a unique dispute resolution method 
whereby foreign investors bring claims against sovereign states for 
breaches of investor protection obligations—has been hit with a wave 
of criticism in recent years. The opponents of ISDS name the lack of 
transparency, consistency, predictability, and overall legitimacy as the 
major shortcomings of the modern system of ISDS. They therefore seek 
to reform the ISDS regime or to replace it with a system of permanent 
international investment courts. 
 Concerns over regulatory disputes may pose the biggest challenge 
to ISDS. Regulatory disputes involve claims by foreign investors 
challenging government measures adopted for legitimate public 
welfare objectives. Such disputes interfere with a government’s ability 
to regulate, encroach on a state’s sovereignty, and may have a chilling 
effect on regulation worldwide. Thus, concerns over regulatory 
disputes have become the primary focus of ISDS opponents in the 
vigorous debate on the future of ISDS. 
 In response to this criticism, the international community has 
already enhanced the transparency and legitimacy of the ISDS regime 
by developing the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency and the 
Mauritius Convention on Transparency, as well as by incorporating 
provisions on qualifications, experience, ethics, and codes of conduct 
for arbitrators into IIAs. States have also become more careful in their 
treaty drafting, seeking to clarify their investor protection obligations 
to reduce the potential for regulatory disputes. 
 A recent multilateral trade and investment treaty, the TPP, has 
gone even farther: the TPP incorporates a tobacco carve-out that allows 
a host state to unilaterally revoke its consent to ISDS on a case-by-case 
basis with respect to claims challenging a tobacco control measure. But 
this may not be optimal. The best answer to the concerns over 
regulatory disputes may be not choosing arbitration over litigation, or 
vice versa. Instead, it may be relying on a hybrid dispute resolution 
system—an investor–state arbitration with the availability of limited 
domestic court review—that would make it amenable to both private 
interests and sovereign public policy considerations. 
